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INTRODUCTION
The Trump Administration is at war with the federal bureaucracy.1 Fueled by a belief that federal officials are “insufficiently loyal
to the president and his agenda,” President Trump has vilified career
civil servants as the “deep state.”2 His penchant for removing officers
who fail to do his bidding and his reliance on acting officers who are
dependent on his good favor are well known.3 Less well known, perhaps, are his efforts to dismantle key components of the civil service

1. See, e.g., Jon Michaels, Opinion, How Trump Is Dismantling a Pillar of the American State, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2017/nov/07/donald-trump-dismantling-american-administrative-state [https://
perma.cc/R8N2-UPHF] (“Trump is vilifying the professional bureaucracy, that vast
community of apolitical, career officials whose work it is to design, administer, and
demand compliance with administrative regulations—and who are, by congressional
design and longstanding practice, well positioned to question and challenge the directives of an abusive, impulsive, or simply hyperpartisan president.”).
2. Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability in the Deep State, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1532, 1534
(2018).
3. A particularly salient example of this practice was his removal of Attorney
General Jeff Sessions, who became the target of President Trump’s ire when he recused
himself from oversight of the investigation into Russian election interference. See Kris
Olson, Too Close for Comfort: An Insider’s View of Presidents and Their Attorneys General,
2019 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1, 14–16. President Trump then circumvented the
usual order of succession within the Justice Department to appoint Matthew Whitaker
as acting Attorney General. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Essay: A New Law Enforcement Agenda
for a New Attorney General, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 232 (2019). President Trump
eventually nominated William Barr to be Attorney General. See Rebecca Roiphe, A Typology of Justice Department Lawyers’ Roles and Responsibilities, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1077,
1122 (2020). Since his confirmation, Attorney General Barr has proven to be a reliable
Trump loyalist. See id. at 1123; see also Charlie Savage, Inspector General Fired by
Trump Urges Whistle-Blowers ‘to Bravely Speak Up,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/michael-atkinson-inspector-general
-fired.html [https://perma.cc/LQP3-JNEE] (describing firing of intelligence community inspector general who had deemed credible a whistleblower complaint concerning President Trump’s alleged coercion of the Ukraine’s government to investigate Joe
Biden); Kyle Cheney, Natasha Bertrand & Meridith McGraw, Impeachment Witnesses
Ousted Amid Fears of Trump Revenge Campaign, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www
.politico.com/news/2020/02/07/donald-trump-pressure-impeachment-witness-alexander-vindman-111997 [https://perma.cc/2AVD-2PKN] (discussing the President’s decision to fire officials who testified during impeachment proceedings before
the House of Representatives).
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system, such as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).4 Recent
United States Supreme Court decisions embracing a strong unitary executive theory bolster the President’s claim to absolute control over
executive officers and facilitate constitutional challenges to statutory
and regulatory provisions that protect their independence.5
These developments challenge the longstanding consensus in favor of civil service protections for federal officers as a means of preventing cronyism and political patronage.6 The loss of such protections is particularly problematic for officials engaged in
administrative adjudication because an unbiased decision-maker is
central to our concept of procedural fairness.7 Accordingly, institutional structures that protect the impartiality of agency adjudicators
and insulate them from undue political pressures are essential to the
constitutional legitimacy of agency adjudication.8 Although there are
4. See Chris Mills Rodrigo, Trump Moving to Dismantle OPM: Report, HILL (Apr.
10, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/438240-trump-moving-to
-dismantle-opm-report [https://perma.cc/77XQ-F27W] (explaining Trump’s efforts
to eliminate the OPM and the outcome if Trump is to succeed).
5. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (invalidating the appointment of SEC
ALJs as a violation of the Appointments Clause); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (invalidating good-cause requirement for the removal
of inferior officers whose supervising principal officers are also subject to good-cause
removal requirements because this arrangement interfered with the President’s duty
to “take care” that the laws are faithfully executed); Exec. Order No. 13,843, Excepting
Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13,
2018) (relying on Lucia to exempt ALJ appointments from competitive civil service
hiring processes); Memorandum from the Solicitor General to Agency General Counsels on Guidance on Administrative Law Judges After Lucia v. SEC (S. Ct.) 9 (July 2018)
[hereinafter Guidance Memorandum], https://static.reuters.com/resources/media/
editorial/20180723/ALJ--SGMEMO.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZFU-5PGF] (indicating
the Department of Justice will only defend good-cause removal requirements for ALJs
if those requirements are “properly read”); see also Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (invalidating good-cause removal provision for director
of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and embracing a strong unitary executive
principle under which good-cause removal requirements are permissible only as narrow exceptions to presidential control over removal).
6. See Todd Brower, The Duty of Fair Representation Under the Civil Service Reform Act: Judicial Power to Protect Employee Rights, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 361, 365 (1987)
(“Civil service reform in the United States began with the Pendleton Act of 1883. . . .
The Pendleton Act provided for appointment to the Federal Civil Service on a merit
basis through competitive examination, rather than through political cronyism.”); David Schultz, The Party’s Over: Partisan Gerrymandering and the First Amendment, 36
CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (2007) (noting that supporters of the Pendleton Act’s reform “believed that the only way to eliminate spoils was to depoliticize the civil service”).
7. See generally infra Part I.A.
8. Of course, administrative adjudicators do not enjoy life tenure or constitutional salary protections, which raises questions concerning compliance with Article
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many different types of adjudicatory officials within administrative
agencies, we focus here on Administrative Law Judges (ALJs).9
There is an inherent conflict of interest when agency officials adjudicate matters in which the agency’s position is adverse to those of
one or more parties, especially if the agency is acting in an enforcement capacity.10 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) addressed
these concerns by providing for a separation of functions in agency
adjudication and applying civil service protections to agency adjudicators.11 Notwithstanding the need for independent adjudication,
III. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 455 (1986). Nonetheless administrative adjudication is, under current doctrine, generally valid when so-called “public
rights” are involved, and even when private rights are involved if the agency’s jurisdiction is not too broad and the courts retain sufficient authority to review the agency’s
decision. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
(upholding adjudication of common law counterclaims by administrative agency); Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized a category of cases involving public rights that Congress can constitutionally assign to non-Article III tribunals.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Our
focus here, however, is not on the constitutionality of administrative adjudication per
se, and we will take as a given that agencies will continue to exercise authority to conduct administrative adjudication.
9. See generally VANESSA K. BURROWS, U.S. CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW (2010). Many agency adjudications are not subject
to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act that are designed to safeguard
agency independence, see infra Part I.B, because the agency’s organic statute does not
require adjudicatory hearings to be “on the record” or because the adjudication falls
within an exception to those procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (providing that “[t]his
section applies . . . in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” and listing six exceptions). Insofar as the agency officials who conduct such adjudications lack independence, these
adjudicatory processes raise fundamental questions. See KENT BARNETT, MALIA REDDICK, LOGAN CORNETT & RUSSELL WHEELER, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL (Draft Feb. 14,
2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Non-ALJ%20Draft%
20Report_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UXY-BDFC] (reviewing the use of non-ALJ decision-makers in agency adjudications).
10. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Dismissing Decisional Independence Suits, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1187, 1187 (2019) (noting “the central tension between agency management and
ALJ decisional independence [in which] agency heads have long sought means of ex
ante control over their adjudicators, aware that their ability to review and reverse ALJ
decisions ex post is a resource-limited one”).
11. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, § 5(c), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237,
240 (1948) (providing for separation of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions); id.
§ 11 (providing for appointment of examiners “[s]ubject to the civil-service . . . laws,”
for removal of examiners only for good cause determined by the Civil Service Commission, and for salary to be determined by the Commission “independently of agency recommendations or ratings”). Congress recodified the APA in 1966 as part of a comprehensive recodification of Title 5 of the United States Code. See Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub.
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agencies retain the ultimate responsibility to enforce their statutory
mandates and make policy within the scope of their delegated authority. Indeed, adjudicatory independence may work against impartial
adjudication if it prevents agencies from removing or disciplining adjudicators who exhibit bias. Accordingly, agencies have a legitimate
interest in ensuring that adjudicators resolve cases promptly, accurately, consistently, and in accordance with laws and regulations. To
accomplish these ends, agencies provide training for ALJs, issue guidance and regulations for ALJ adjudications, and typically have de novo
decisional authority when they review ALJ decisions. The line between appropriate agency oversight and improper interference with
ALJ independence is not always an easy one to draw, however, and
agencies sometimes seek to impose policies through informal mechanisms that arguably assert improper influence over ALJ decisions.12
Recent Supreme Court decisions and executive actions raise concerns about the neutrality and independence of ALJs. On the judicial
front, the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board13 cast doubt on the constitutionality of
good-cause removal provisions for ALJs who work in independent

L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966).
At the time of the APA’s adoption, agency adjudicators whose adjudications were
covered by that statute were referred to as hearing examiners. In 1978, Congress replaced the term “hearing examiner” in the APA and various other statutes with the new
title, “Administrative Law Judge.” Pub. L. No. 95–251, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 183 (1978). Later
that year, Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No.
95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978), which established the current federal civil service system. “The CSRA, which became effective January 11, 1979, replaced the Civil Service
Commission with three new independent agencies: Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), which manages the Federal work force; Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA), which oversees Federal labor-management relations; and the [Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB)].” About MSPB, MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., https://www.mspb.gov/
About/about.htm [https://perma.cc/625G-N43L]; see Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, §§ 201(a), 202(a), 92 Stat. 1118–31.
12. See, e.g., Ass’n of Admin. L. Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.
1984), amended by 1985 WL 71829 (D.D.C. 1985) (invalidating “Bellmon” review program in which the Social Security Administration targeted ALJs with high allowance
rates for review because targeted review interfered with their decisional independence).
13. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010)
(invalidating good-cause requirement for the removal of inferior officers whose supervising principal officers are also subject to good-cause removal requirements because
this arrangement interfered with the President’s duty to “take care” that the laws are
faithfully executed).
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agencies.14 More recently, Lucia v. SEC15 invalidated the appointment
of ALJs by an agency’s chief ALJ, casting doubt on the validity of most
ALJ appointments. Although agencies could easily cure this defect by
ratifying prior appointments,16 President Trump issued an Executive
Order exempting ALJs from the competitive civil service hiring process conducted by OPM altogether.17 In addition, President Trump’s
Solicitor General issued post-Lucia guidance advancing a legal position that would weaken good-cause removal protections for ALJs.18
These developments, in turn, make ALJs more susceptible to informal,
unwritten, and at times unlawful policy directives that circumvent
both APA procedures and public scrutiny.19
In this Article, we suggest that one response to concerns about
ALJ neutrality would be to follow the central panel model that many
states use for administrative adjudication.20 This approach would

14. Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020), decided while this Article was in press, also invalidated a good-cause removal provision
as a violation of Article II. Its implications for ALJs are less clear. As discussed further
infra notes 183–210 and accompanying text, the decision likely permits the continued
use of good-cause removal provisions for ALJs but may cast doubt on the good-cause
removal provision for the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
15. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (invalidating the appointment of
ALJs by SEC’s chief ALJ because this arrangement violated the Appointments Clause).
16. See, e.g., Patrick L. Butler, Saving Disgorgement from Itself: SEC Enforcement
After Kokesh v. SEC, 68 DUKE L.J. 333, 362 (2018) (reporting that the SEC ratified prior
ALJ appointments in accordance with the Appointments Clause after Lucia); David
Hahn, Late for an Appointment: Balancing Impartiality and Accountability in the IRS Office of Appeals, 103 MINN. L. REV. 385, 420 (2018). The Supreme Court in Lucia declined
to rule on the validity of the SEC’s ratification order. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 n.6.
17. Exec. Order No. 13,843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018).
18. See Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5 (specifying that the Justice Department would only defend good-cause removal restrictions if they are interpreted so as
to “allow for removal of an ALJ who fails to perform adequately or to follow agency
policies, procedures, or instructions,” so long as an administrative official is not “removed for any invidious reason or to influence the outcome in a particular adjudication”); see also id. (indicating that MSPB review must be “suitably deferential to the
determination of the Department Head”).
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 601 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?
DocumentFileKey=3ab796d4-9636-d856-48e5-b638021eb54d [https://perma.cc/
QG7H-45CS] (providing for the creation of an Office of Administrative Hearings). For a
history of the development of the central panel model in the states and an assessment
of its pros and cons in that context, see Malcolm C. Rich & Alison C. Goldstein, The Need
for a Central Panel Approach to Administrative Adjudication: Pros, Cons, and Selected
Practices, 39 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 4 (2019), which states that, “The
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establish an independent corps of federal ALJs, who would no longer
be officers of the agencies that employ them.21 A properly constructed
central panel could avoid the constitutional issues presented by Lucia
and Free Enterprise Fund and provide greater security for ALJ neutrality and independence. At the same time, ALJs could continue to specialize in cases for particular agencies so as to promote specialized expertise and the agency itself would retain final decisional authority
and the ability to make policy through legislative rules and precedential adjudications that bind independent ALJs.
The Article proceeds in three steps. First, we discuss the fundamental requirement of impartial adjudication in light of the constitutional requirements of Article III and due process.22 Second, we consider how judicial decisions and executive actions raise concerns
about the stability and sufficiency of current protections for ALJ independence.23 Finally, we suggest that the creation of an independent
ALJ corps using the central panel model is an appropriate and effective
response and sketch out the basic contours of such an approach.24
Ultimately, the independence of administrative adjudication is a
critical protection for the rule of law. Although other recent threats to
the rule of law may deservedly garner the headlines, we should not
lose sight of the critical role that impartial agency adjudication plays.
Taking reasonable steps toward securing independent and impartial
adjudication by agencies is a nonpartisan issue that Congress can and
should address.

central panel approach was created to bring a new level of due process to state-based
administrative adjudication.”
21. The Chief Administrative Law Judge and Director of the State of North Carolina’s Office of Administrative Hearings has described a central panel as “an autonomous, quasi-judicial, executive branch agency composed of an independent cadre of
administrative law judges . . . [which] is designed to separate the hearings function
from the investigative and prosecutorial functions in state administrative law.” Judge
Julian Mann, III, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative Litigation: North Carolina’s Office of Administrative Hearings, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 60, 64 (2015) (footnote omitted); see also Judge Julian Mann, III, Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a
Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1641 (2001) (explaining that North Carolina’s
central panel approach was “established to ensure that administrative decisions are
made in a fair and impartial manner to protect the due process rights of citizens who
challenge administrative action and to provide a source of independent administrative
law judges . . . [to] prevent the commingling of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the administrative process” (internal quotations omitted)).
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
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I. INDEPENDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
A. CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
The Constitution safeguards the impartiality of federal adjudications through structural protections in Article III and individual rights
protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.25
Although some forms of administrative adjudication may violate Article III,26 under current doctrine the independence of the administrative adjudicators who serve in place of Article III judges is not a relevant consideration in making that determination. Thus, the critical
constitutional protection for the independence of administrative adjudication is procedural due process, which requires notice and the
opportunity to be heard by an unbiased decision-maker when the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.27
At first blush, administrative adjudication is difficult to square
with Article III, which vests judicial power in the federal courts staffed
by judges with life tenure and salary protections.28 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that many executive actions resemble judicial decisions in that they require the determination of
facts and the application of law.29 Indeed, even quintessentially executive functions, such as deciding to prosecute an accused person for
the commission of a crime, require that the prosecutor make a factual
25. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.”); id. amends. V, XIV (prohibiting the deprivation of “life, liberty,
or property without due process of law”). The Constitution also provides for trial by
jury in both civil and criminal cases. Id. amends. VI (criminal cases), VII (civil cases).
Because ALJs lack the authority to conduct jury trials and cannot adjudicate cases if the
right to a jury trial attaches and has not been waived, ALJ independence and the right
to a jury trial do not interact in meaningful ways.
26. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (articulating a three-part test under which administrative adjudication may violate Article
III if it transfers the essential attributes of judicial power from courts to an agency,
concerns rights at the core of the judicial power, and reflects improper or inadequate
legislative purposes).
27. See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (“[D]ue process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities.”).
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
29. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855)
(upholding administrative adjudication of public rights). See generally Richard E. Levy
& Sidney A. Shapiro, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a StandardsBased Theory of Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 499, 507–24 (2006) (discussing origins and rationale of the public rights doctrine).
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determination concerning the defendant’s conduct and apply the law
to assess whether a violation has occurred. Thus, “quasi-judicial”
agency decisions are a well-established feature of administrative law.
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed two distinct doctrines that accommodate most forms of administrative adjudication.
First, Congress is generally free to delegate adjudication of so-called
“public rights” to administrative agencies.30 Second, administrative
agencies may function as adjunct factfinders for the courts,31 provided
that the essential functions of the judiciary are retained by the

30. See Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929, 939–42 (D.C. Cir. 2014); cf. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (“[W]hen Congress creates new statutory ‘public
rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury
trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment’s injunction
that jury trial is to be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law.’” (quoting Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977))). The public
rights doctrine is often defended on the theory that public rights implicate sovereign
immunity and a party who would otherwise be denied any remedy whatsoever cannot
complain that Congress has provided only a nonjudicial one. See id. at 68–69 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This explanation is unsatisfactory
on many levels, see Levy & Shapiro, supra note 29, at 519–24, not the least of which is
that public rights may include cases in which the government is not a party. Recent
cases generally indicate, without extended discussion, that adjudication of public
rights is sufficiently executive in character to allow for administrative adjudication.
See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018) (“This Court has not definitively explained the distinction between public and
private rights [but] the doctrine covers matters which arise between the Government
and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.” (internal quotations
and citations omitted)).
31. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (“In cases of equity and admiralty,
it is historic practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without the consent of the
parties, masters, and commissioners or assessors, to pass upon certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account or to find the amount of damages.”).
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courts.32 The independence and impartiality of agency adjudicators is
not a relevant consideration under either of these doctrines.33
Thus, constitutional challenges to the independence and impartiality of agency adjudications generally arise under procedural due
process. The first step in procedural due process analysis is to determine whether the government has deprived a person of a protected
interest in life, liberty, or property.34 In light of the Supreme Court’s
recognition that legal entitlements to government benefits, licenses,
jobs, and other benefits are protected interests,35 most administrative
adjudications trigger due process safeguards. The core requirements
of procedural due process are notice and the opportunity to be heard
by an impartial or unbiased decision-maker.36 Whatever form the notice and hearing take, those safeguards are not meaningful if the decision-maker is not impartial.37
Of course, impartiality may mean different things in different
contexts.38 Bias may arise because of a decision-maker’s personal
prejudices or a relationship to the parties in a particular case.39 Our
32. The Court currently applies a multi-factor test from Schor to determine
whether courts retain a sufficient role. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). Under the Schor test, courts consider (1) the extent to which
the essential attributes of judicial power have been taken from the courts and given to
the agency in light of the agency’s jurisdiction, the scope of judicial review, and other
considerations; (2) the nature and origins of the right being asserted; and (3) the reasons for delegating adjudicatory authority to the agency. Id. It is unclear whether administrative adjudication of public rights is per se valid or is governed by the Schor
test, but even if the Schor test does apply, the nature and origins of the right as a public
right means that the Schor test is normally satisfied by administrative adjudication of
public rights.
33. Under Granfinanciera, a right is a “public right” if the government is a party or
if the right is a congressionally created right that is part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme. 492 U.S. at 54.
34. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
35. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
36. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 740–41 (3d ed. 2020).
37. Thus, as early as 1610, in Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652
(KB), Lord Coke stated broadly that “[t]he Censors, cannot be Judges, Ministers, and
parties; Judges, to give sentence or judgment; Ministers to make summons; and Parties,
to have the moiety of the forfeiture, . . . and one cannot be Judge and Attorney for any
of the parties.”
38. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–78 (2002) (identifying three distinct meanings of impartiality in the context of canons of conduct regulating judicial campaign speech).
39. See, e.g., United Nurses Ass’ns of Cal. v. NLRB, 871 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir.
2017) (refusing to infer ALJ bias against an employer charged with unfair labor practices based on the ALJ’s adverse credibility determinations, unfavorable evidentiary
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focus here is on more systemic concerns related to structures that secure ALJ independence, by which we mean freedom from political
pressures that compromise the ALJ’s ability to decide cases on their
merits in light of the facts in the record and the applicable law. The
expectation that ALJs will follow valid agency policies adopted
through legislative rules, precedential adjudications, or other appropriate means is not inconsistent with adjudicatory independence. On
the other hand, institutional structures that fail to protect the independence of ALJs may violate due process on a systemic level or lead
to violations in particular cases.
Despite the importance of an impartial decision-maker to procedural fairness, it is typically difficult to establish a due process violation based on bias. The courts afford a general presumption of impartiality for government officials who make quasi-judicial decisions.40
This presumption is ordinarily difficult to rebut, and claims of bias in
individual cases usually fail.41 The presumption does not apply, however, when the particular circumstances create too great a risk of bias
or appearance of impropriety, such as when the decision-maker has a
financial stake in the outcome,42 a relationship with one of the parties,43 or prior involvement with the case.44
Nonetheless, the Constitution does not ordinarily preclude the
current model for agency adjudication, even though the agency employs the ALJs (or other officials) who conduct its adjudications. Thus,
for example, the Supreme Court has upheld the adjudication of benefit
claims by agency officials despite the potential conflict between the
rulings, questioning of the employer’s witnesses, and alleged expressions of impatience or anger).
40. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (holding that claims of bias
“must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators”).
41. Thus, for example, Social Security claimants often argue unsuccessfully that
an ALJ was biased against them. E.g., Spicher v. Berryhill, 898 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2018);
Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2011); Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,
574 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2009); Keith v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2007); Bayliss
v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2005).
42. See, e.g., Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (holding that adjudication by mayor whose town benefited from proceeds violated due process).
43. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that
state supreme court justice’s participation in case involving donor who contributed
millions of dollars to his campaign violated due process).
44. See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016) (“[U]nder the
Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier
had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding
the defendant’s case.”).
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official’s role as neutral adjudicator and the agency’s interests in preserving its resources by denying benefits.45 Particular institutional arrangements or efforts to control agency adjudicators in particular
cases, however, may violate due process.46
B. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR ALJ INDEPENDENCE
The fairness of agency adjudications was one of the central concerns that fueled the adoption of the APA, which established important protections for the independence of ALJs (although they were
called hearing examiners at the time of the APA’s adoption).47 First,
§ 554(d) mandated the separation of an agency’s prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions and prohibited ex parte contacts during an adjudication.48 Second, the APA provided that hearing examiners would
be subject to civil service protections, including merit selection, goodcause requirements for adverse employment actions, and salary

45. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1982) (upholding adjudication of Medicare Part B claims by employees of fiscal intermediaries that processed
claims for agency); Withrow, 421 U.S. at 57 (upholding the revocation of a medical license by a board that combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions); Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (rejecting due process challenge to ALJs’ wearing “two
hats” in disability benefit adjudications).
46. For example, if an agency awarded pay increases based on adjudicatory outcomes that favored the agency, such an arrangement would certainly violate due process.
47. See generally Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978) (discussing the
APA’s safeguards for independence of hearing examiners and concluding that they
were sufficiently like judges so as to warrant judicial immunity).
48. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). First, paragraph (d)(1) specifies that a hearing examiner
may not “consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity
for all parties to participate.” Id. § 554(d)(1). Congress later expanded and strengthened the ban on ex parte communications. See id. § 557(d). Second, under § 554(d)(2),
the hearing examiner may not “be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency.” Id. § 554(d)(2). Further, “[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a
case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision,
recommended decision, or agency review . . . except as witness or counsel in public
proceedings.” Id.
Notwithstanding this institutional separation, the initiation by an agency of enforcement actions presided over by an ALJ who works for the agency creates at least
the appearance of a conflict of interest that may undermine the perception of ALJ independence. Thus, the central panel model we endorse below may be desirable even
if the recent threats to ALJ independence that are the focus of this Article had not occurred.

2020]

ALJ INDEPENDENCE

51

determinations made independently of any agency performance evaluation.49
The provisions of § 554(d) require an institutional separation between the agency’s enforcement staff and its adjudicatory functions.50
This separation is likely necessary to prevent due process violations,
insofar as the role of the agency in enforcing the law is clearly incompatible with its operation as an impartial adjudicator.51 This institutional separation is not absolute, however. First, the APA’s separation
of functions constraints do not apply “to the agency or a member or
members of the body comprising the agency.”52 Second, non-adversarial procedures in which an ALJ wears “two hats” are also permissible, at least in cases involving the administration of benefits.53 While
these institutional separation provisions may be imperfect, they have
functioned reasonably well and have not been affected by recent developments.
Thus, our principal concerns relate to the erosion of civil service
protections. As noted above,54 the original APA applied these protections to hearing examiners, as ALJs were then called, and those protections were carried forward when Congress created the position of
ALJ and revised the civil service laws. These civil service protections
include (1) good-cause requirements for disciplinary actions, including removal and salary reductions;55 (2) salary determinations insulated from the agency’s control or influence;56 and (3) competitive

49. See infra notes 50–58 and accompanying text (discussing these protections).
50. See also 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (“Administrative law judges shall be assigned to cases
in rotation so far as practicable, and may not perform duties inconsistent with their
duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges.”).
51. See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2016) (holding that
it violated due process for a former prosecutor with prior involvement in a case to sit
as a judge in a subsequent appeal).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(C).
53. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (rejecting the argument
that a Social Security hearing examiner’s “advocate-judge-multiple-hat” role violated
due process because a hearing examiner is not acting as counsel, but as an examiner
with the duty of developing facts); see also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 199–
200 (1982) (upholding the adjudication of Medicare Part B claims by employees of
“fiscal intermediaries”).
54. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (providing that an agency may take an action “against
an administrative law judge appointed under section 3105 of this title . . . only for good
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the Board” and listing removal and reduction
in pay as covered actions).
56. See 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (establishing pay scales for ALJs).
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appointments.57 These protections play an essential role in ensuring
the independence and impartiality of ALJs.
The first two protections—good cause for removal or other discipline and independent salary determinations—mirror the protections that Article III affords federal judges, albeit in somewhat weakened form. Good-cause removal is akin to life tenure, although the
grounds that constitute good cause for removal are broader than the
grounds for impeachment and removal of judges. ALJs are also exempt
from performance evaluations, which prevents the agencies that employ ALJs from adjusting ALJ salaries based on the results of their decisions.58
Until recently,59 ALJs were also subject to the OPM’s competitive
appointment processes.60 Under this system, appointing agencies are
required to select an employee from the top three eligible candidates
based on examination scores (after adjustment for veterans’

57. See 5 U.S.C. § 3304; Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1643, 1654 (2016) [hereinafter Barnett, Against AJs].
58. See 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (excluding ALJs from the definition of “employee”
for purposes of civil service performance evaluations provisions); James P. Timony,
Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 629,
631–32 (1994) (discussing provisions of original APA prohibiting performance evaluation of ALJs and Congress’s subsequent rejection of proposals for performance evaluation of ALJs in order to protect their decisional independence). Not everyone shares
the view that prohibiting performance evaluations of ALJs is a good thing. A 1992 ACUS
report, for example, recommended periodic performance evaluations. See ADMIN. CONF.
OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 92-7: THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY (1992),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/92-7_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6YNW-NM5C]; see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
589 (1994).
59. See infra notes 89–131 and accompanying text (discussing executive order
exempting ALJs from competitive appointment).
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 3304(b) (“An individual may be appointed in the competitive
service only if he has passed an examination or is specifically excepted from examination under section 3302 of this title.”). Although the original APA provided explicitly
for the appointment of hearing examiners through competitive processes, this explicit
requirement was eliminated when the APA was recodified, apparently because Congress thought it unnecessary insofar as competitive selection was the default rule for
federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 note (“The words ‘Subject to the civil service’
are omitted as unnecessary inasmuch as appointments are made subject to the civil
service laws unless specifically excepted.”). OPM regulations, however, explicitly provided for the application of competitive hiring to ALJs. See 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a) (2020)
(“An agency may appoint an individual to an administrative law judge position only
with prior approval of OPM, except when it makes its selection from the list of eligibles
provided by OPM.”).
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preferences).61 Competitive appointment is designed primarily to prevent cronyism and ensure that appointments are based on merit,62 but
as applied to ALJs it also has the effect of depoliticizing these appointments in a manner that promotes the independence and impartiality
of adjudication.63
As this Part has explained, both the Constitution and federal statutes have provided important protections for ALJ independence. As
Part II demonstrates, these safeguards are at risk as a result of a combination of recent judicial decisions and presidential actions.
II. THREATS TO ALJ INDEPENDENCE
Through the APA and civil services laws, Congress incorporated
statutory protections for the independence of ALJs, including competitive merit selection and good-cause requirements for removal or
other disciplinary actions.64 In the last decade, however, a combination of judicial decisions creating constitutional uncertainty and
61. See 5 U.S.C. § 3318(a) (“The nominating or appointing authority shall select
for appointment to each vacancy from the highest three eligibles . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the ‘Hidden Judiciary’: How the Merit Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part I), 63 JUDICATURE 60, 64–65
(1979) (“The introduction of a merit system was justified primarily [by] . . . the attentive public’s perception of the legitimacy of adjudication and . . . issues of competence
. . . .”).
63. See Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The APA creates a comprehensive bulwark to protect ALJs from agency interference. The independence
granted to ALJs is designed to maintain public confidence in the essential fairness of
the process . . . by ensuring impartial decisionmaking.”); Advancing the Judicial Independence and Efficiency of the Administrative Judiciary: A Report to the President-Elect
of the United States, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 93, 99 (2009) (stating that APA
provisions designed to safeguard ALJ independence include “a merit competitive civil
service selection process administered by OPM . . . to ensure that ALJs are . . . able to
exercise independent judgment in deciding cases without the influence of agency pressure”); Article II—Appointments Clause—Officers of the United States—Lucia v. SEC,
132 HARV. L. REV. 287, 288 n.13 (2018) (noting that, before Lucia, ALJs “were selected
through a competitive civil service hiring process designed to ensure their expertise
and impartiality”). Similar considerations have led many states to adopt merit-based
selection processes for judges, although there are some who criticize these mechanisms as antidemocratic and prone to a different sort of politicization. See, e.g., Luke
Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 860 (2002) (“Analysis likewise indicates that the merit selection process does not remove the effects of politics.
Rather it alters the dynamics of how political considerations are manifested.”).
64. As noted above, these safeguards mirror to some extent the protections designed to assure the independence and impartiality afforded to, and expected by, Article III judges. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. But cf. Nou, supra note 10,
at 1190 (“ALJ decisional independence is . . . distinct from the more familiar notion of
Article III judicial independence [because] ALJs hold adjudicatory proceedings but also
reside in the lower ranks of the executive branch hierarchy.”).
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executive branch actions targeting appointment and removal have undermined ALJ independence. These shifts in administrative law doctrine and processes enhance the degree to which the President and his
political appointees can control or influence, directly or indirectly, ALJ
decision-making. In this Part, we explore the growing threats to ALJ
independence.
A. APPOINTMENTS
Two recent developments concerning the appointment of ALJs
have combined to remove them from the competitive hiring process.
First, in Lucia v. SEC,65 the Supreme Court held that ALJs are officers of
the United States whose appointment by agency personnel other than
the head of the agency violates the Appointments Clause. Second, the
Trump Administration responded to Lucia by issuing Executive Order
13,843,66 which exempts ALJs from the competitive hiring process. As
a result, the traditional safeguards intended to ensure ALJ competence
and prevent cronyism and patronage are no longer in place.67
1. Lucia and ALJ Appointments
The Constitution’s Appointments Clause provides two different
methods for the appointment of executive officers. First, it vests in the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the authority to
appoint “Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
law.”68 Second, it authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint “inferior Officers . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.”69 The Appointments Clause only applies to
“Officers of the United States,” which the Supreme Court has construed to include “any appointee exercising significant authority

65. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).
66. Exec. Order No. 13,843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018). The Solicitor General’s Office relied on Lucia to issue guidance that signals an effort to weaken good-cause removal
protections for ALJs as well. See Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5; infra notes 188–
96 and accompanying text (discussing Guidance Memorandum and its implications).
67. See Peter M. Shane, Trump’s Quiet Power Grab, ATLANTIC (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/trumps-quiet-power-grab/
607087 [https://perma.cc/KF7U-SEVV] (“[T]he Trump administration wants to upend a long-standing system for assuring both the reality and appearance of fairness in
agency adjudication . . . .”).
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
69. Id.

2020]

ALJ INDEPENDENCE

55

pursuant to the laws of the United States.”70 Under the Appointments
Clause, then, the critical issues for the appointment of ALJs are (1)
whether they are officers of the United States and (2) if so, whether
they qualify as “principal” or inferior officers.
It seems reasonably clear that ALJs are officers of the United
States. In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,71 the Supreme
Court upheld the Tax Court’s power to appoint special judges. It concluded that special judges were officers of the United States because
of “the significance of the duties and discretion that [they] possess,”72
but it upheld their appointment by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court
because the Tax Court is a “Court of Law” for purposes of the Appointments Clause.73 The latter holding necessarily implies that special
judges are inferior officers, because principal officers may only be appointed by the President with Senate consent.74 The decision in Freytag set the stage for the Court’s consideration in Lucia as to whether
ALJs are officers of the United States.
In Lucia, the SEC had initiated an administrative enforcement
proceeding against the defendant and his investment company, alleging violations of securities laws.75 An ALJ appointed by SEC staff pursuant to the OPM’s competitive hiring process conducted a hearing
and issued an initial decision finding violations and imposing sanctions.76 The defendant argued that the ALJ’s decision was invalid because he had not been constitutionally appointed.77 The Supreme
70. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). Congress has the authority to specify the method of appointing government officials who do not qualify as
officers of the United States (sometimes referred to simply as employees or “lesser
functionaries”). Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991).
71. 501 U.S. 868.
72. Id. at 881. The Court reasoned that the office of special trial judge is “established by Law” in that “the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are
specified by statute,” and that special trial judges “perform more than ministerial tasks.
They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the
power to enforce compliance with discovery orders. In the course of carrying out these
important functions, the special trial judges exercise significant discretion.” Id. at 881–
82.
73. Id. at 888–92.
74. See, e.g., id. at 882 (referring to conclusion that “special trial judges are ‘inferior Officers’”).
75. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049–50 (2018).
76. Id. at 2050 (noting that “the Commission had left the task of appointing ALJs,
including Judge Elliot, to SEC staff members”).
77. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, divided evenly, issuing a per curiam opinion
upholding the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 2049–51 (citing Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868
F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). The Supreme Court granted review to resolve a circuit
split, which arose because the 10th Circuit had held that SEC ALJs were officers of the
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Court agreed, relying on Freytag to hold that SEC ALJs are officers of
the United States whose appointment must comply with the Appointments Clause.78
The Court in Lucia reasoned that, like the special judges in Freytag, SEC ALJs hold appointments to a position created by statute and
“exercise the same ‘significant discretion’ when carrying out the same
‘important functions’” as special judges do.79 Indeed, SEC ALJs “can
play [a] more autonomous role”80 to the extent that special judge decisions must be reviewed by a Tax Court Judge,81 while the SEC may
decline to review an ALJ decision, which then becomes the agency’s
decision.82 Because SEC ALJs were therefore officers of the United
States, they could not be appointed by SEC staff, and the Court remanded for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ.83
United States whose appointment was governed by the Appointments Clause. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 855 F.3d
1128 (10th Cir. 2017).
78. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053 (“Freytag says everything necessary to decide this
case.”); see also Jones Bros. v. Sec’y of Lab., 898 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding, based
on Lucia, that appointment of Mine Safety and Health Administration ALJ violated the
Appointments Clause).
79. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053. Both sets of adjudicators “have all the authority
needed to ensure fair and orderly adversarial hearings—indeed, nearly all the tools of
federal trial judges,” including the authority to take testimony, conduct trials, rule on
the admissibility of evidence, enforce compliance with discovery orders, and punish
other contemptuous conduct. Id.
80. Id.
81. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(c) (providing that the Tax Court may authorize a special
trial judge “to make the decision of the court” in specified proceedings, “subject to such
conditions and review as the court may provide”); see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S.
868, 874 (1991) (referring to special trial judges’ “lack of authority actually to decide
[cases concerning liens and levies], which is reserved exclusively for judges of the Tax
Court”).
82. 138 S. Ct. at 2053–54; see also Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) are officers of
the United States and that their authority to issue final decisions on behalf of the Patent
and Trademark Office without review by a principal officer made them principal officers, but severing and invalidating statutory provision that imposed good-cause restrictions on removal of APJs, thereby converting them into inferior officers). The Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
561 U.S. 477, 508–10 (2010), also invalidated good-cause removal restrictions to cure
a constitutional violation (the existence of double good-cause removal restrictions).
According to Professor Barnett, “courts frequently sever offending removal provisions
as a cure for Article II violations.” Kent Barnett, Regulating Impartiality in Agency Adjudication, 69 DUKE L.J. 1695, 1718 (2020) [hereinafter Barnett, Impartiality].
83. That person could not be the ALJ who issued the original decision, even if he
were validly reappointed, because “[h]e cannot be expected to consider the matter as
though he had not adjudicated it before. To cure the constitutional error, another ALJ
(or the Commission itself) must hold the new hearing to which Lucia is entitled.” Lucia,
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Although Lucia addressed only the status of SEC ALJs, its analysis appears to apply equally to ALJs in other agencies, who are therefore
likely officers of the United States as well.84
Although Lucia did not discuss it,85 ALJs are probably inferior officers whose appointment Congress may delegate to the heads of departments, rather than principal officers who must be appointed by
the President with Senate consent.86 The prevailing test for making
that determination is whether the officer’s “work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”87 Applying this
138 S. Ct. at 2055. On remand, the D.C. Circuit remanded to the SEC for a new hearing
before another ALJ or the Commission. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 736 F. App’x 2
(D.C. Cir. 2018). Compare Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796
F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that decision by Copyright Royalty Judges properly
appointed by the Librarian of Congress following invalidation of decision by an improperly appointed panel of judges remedied the original constitutional violation, even
though the new panel reviewed the existing record de novo instead of holding a new
hearing).
84. In a pending case, however, an organization of Social Security ALJs has argued
that federal ALJs should be treated as mere employees because of “a labyrinth of detailed agency regulations, policies and guidelines that cabin their decision-making processes.” See Brief of Amicus Curiae SSA ALJ Collective in Support of Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae at 9, Fleming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 17-1246 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 6, 2020);
see also id. at 5 (arguing that “the holding in Lucia is narrow and relates only to SEC
ALJs” and that “there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to the Article II question”).
In the alternative, the Collective has argued that even if ALJs are officers of the United
States, the good-cause removal protections provided by 5 U.S.C. § 7521 are not unconstitutional because they “are not an inappropriate impediment to executive power
given the constitutional pedigree of the APA and the legitimate need for decisional independence for adjudicators.” Id. at 14–15.
85. The Court’s opinion only considered whether SEC ALJs are officers of the
United States and did not refer to them as either principal or inferior officers. Likewise,
the Court’s discussion of the remedy referred only to a new hearing before a “properly
appointed official.” 138 S. Ct. at 2055; see also id. at 2056 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“I address only the dividing line between ‘Officers of the United States,’ who are subject to the Appointments Clause, and nonofficer employees, who are not. I express no
view on . . . the difference between principal officers and inferior officers under the
Appointments Clause.”).
86. This is the position that the Solicitor General took in the wake of Lucia. See
Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2 (indicating that “all ALJs and similarly situated administrative judges should be appointed as inferior officers under the Appointments Clause”).
87. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997); see also Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010). In an earlier decision, the
Court had identified several factors that are relevant to distinguishing between principal and inferior officers, including whether the officer (1) is removable by an officer
beneath the President; (2) has or lacks significant policymaking discretion or authority; (3) has limited jurisdiction; and (4) has limited tenure. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
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test to other classes of administrative judges, lower courts have considered factors such as whether decisions are subject to administrative review, the employing agency’s authority to engage in administrative oversight, and the power to remove officers.88 As we will
discuss more fully below, ALJ decisions are subject to de novo administrative review within the agency that employs them, which suggests
that they are inferior officers.89 The requirement of good cause to remove ALJs, however, might support the contention that they are principal officers because it enhances their authority and weakens the
oversight to which they are subject.90
If, as the Solicitor General has concluded, ALJs are inferior, not
principal officers, agencies could correct the problem of improper ALJ
appointment under Lucia if the head of the agency reappoints its ALJs,
clearing them to issue decisions in future cases.91 While the immediate
654, 671–72 (1988). The lower courts noted some tension between the two approaches. See, e.g., United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2000).
88. See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 953 F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The lack of any presidentially-appointed officer who can review, vacate, or correct decisions by [administrative patent judges] combined with the limited removal power lead us to conclude
. . . that these are principal officers.”); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (engaging in similar reasoning to conclude that
Copyright Royalty Judges are principal officers). Interestingly, both Arthrex and Intercollegiate cured the constitutional violation by severing the good-cause removal provision in the respective statutes, thereby converting the officers in question into inferior officers subject to removal by officers removable at will by the President.
89. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as
it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”).
90. See infra notes 168–75 and accompanying text (discussing interaction between Lucia and good-cause removal requirements for purposes of ALJs’ status as
principal or inferior officers).
91. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 n.6 (2018) (noting that the SEC had
ratified the appointments of ALJs, but declining to rule on the effect of the ratification);
Important Information Regarding Possible Challenges to the Appointment of Administrative Law Judges in SSA’s Administrative Process—UPDATE, EM-18003 REV 2, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/reference.nsf/links/08062018
021025PM [https://perma.cc/C7MF-S7HL] (“On July 16, 2018, the Acting Commissioner ratified the appointment of ALJs and AAJs and approved their appointments as
her own in order to address any Appointments Clause questions involving SSA
claims.”); Giles D. Beal IV, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: SEC Administrative Law Judges
Post-Dodd Frank, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 413, 437 (2016) (“In order to fix the constitutional flaw in the appointment process for its ALJs, the SEC could implement a relatively easy solution: re-appoint the ALJs in a constitutionally valid manner.”). This remedy, however, would not resolve the question of how the agency must proceed with
respect to cases decided by improperly appointed ALJs. For discussion of this issue,
see generally Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Appointment
with Trouble, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459, 1481–85 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Trouble];
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holding of Lucia thus requires an adjustment to the appointment of
ALJs, that adjustment, in itself, does not present a significant threat to
ALJ independence so long as agency heads appoint ALJs pursuant to
competitive civil service processes. The Trump Administration, however, seized upon Lucia to exempt ALJ hiring from the competitive civil
services process altogether, an action that does present a threat to ALJ
independence.92
2. Executive Action Exempting ALJ Appointment from the Civil
Service
As indicated above, merit selection pursuant to civil service hiring processes has been a core protection for administrative adjudication since the adoption of the APA in 1946.93 After civil service reform
legislation in 1978, the so-called “rule of three,” applied to ALJ hiring.
Under this process, OPM would rank ALJ applicants based on the results of a civil service examination it administers, and an agency was
required to select an ALJ from the top three ranked candidates.94
and Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2014) [hereinafter Barnett, Toil].
92. As will be discussed further below, see infra notes 188–96 and accompanying
text, Lucia may also support executive efforts to assert broader power to remove ALJs.
See Barnett, Impartiality, supra note 82, at 1697–98 (arguing that Lucia triggers concern over “ALJs’ insulation” and “undermines [their] . . . appearance of impartiality” by
raising the possibility that supervising officials can remove them at will); see also Seila
L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (reasoning that goodcause removal requirements are permissible only as narrow exceptions to presidential
control over removal).
93. See supra note 11. The original APA mandated that hearing examiners who
presided over APA adjudications (when the agency itself did not) had to be hired using
civil service processes. This practice was carried forward after the APA was recodified,
even though the recodification omitted an explicit statutory requirement. See Pub. L.
No. 89-554, §§ 3317–18, 80 Stat. 378, 421 (1966). The Civil Service Commission
adopted regulations explicitly extending civil service hiring procedures to hearing examiners in 1968. Administrative Personnel, Civil Service Commission, 33 Fed. Reg.
12,402, 12,427 (Sept. 4, 1968).
94. See 5 U.S.C. § 3318(a); Barnett, Against AJs, supra note 57 (describing the “Rule
of Three”). Under OPM’s process, ALJ applicants had to have at least seven years’ experience as an attorney and at least two years’ litigation experience. They were ranked
on a 100-point scale based on their experience, references, interview, and test scores.
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Regulatory Accountability Act Loses Steam but the Trump Executive Order on ALJ Selection Upturned 71 Years of Practice, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 741, 744–
45 (2019). Disabled veterans were given a preference. Id. at 745. Then-Professor Antonin Scalia argued that Congress did not intend for OPM to rank ALJ candidates. Rather, “it was evidently contemplated that the Civil Service Commission would establish
qualifying requirements by general rule, and that the agencies would then select from
among all individuals who met those requirements.” Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—
A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 59 (1979) (emphasis added).
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OPM’s process was designed “to render [ALJ] appointments nonpolitical.”95 Lucia’s conclusion that SEC ALJs are officers of the United
States whose appointment is governed by the Appointments Clause,
however, raised a question as to whether OPM’s role in the ALJ selection process improperly constrains the authority of the agencies hiring them. President Trump apparently thought the answer was yes.
Less than a month after the Supreme Court handed down Lucia,
President Trump issued Executive Order 13,843.96 The Order recounts that “The Federal Government benefits from a professional cadre of [ALJs] . . . who are impartial and committed to the rule of law.”97
Nonetheless, it construed Lucia as raising questions about the existing
appointment process, including “whether competitive examination
and competitive service selection procedures are compatible with the
discretion an agency head must possess under the Appointments
Clause in selecting ALJs.”98 Further, “sound policy reasons” supported
taking steps to eliminate doubts about the constitutionality of ALJ appointment methods. Accordingly, the Order provides “that conditions
of good administration” require exempting ALJs from competitive hiring rules and examinations to “provide agency heads with additional
flexibility to assess prospective appointees without the limitations imposed by competitive examination and competitive service selection
procedures.”99
The Order exempts ALJs from the competitive civil service hiring
process by amending OPM’s rules that govern competitive civil service
exemptions. It creates a new “Schedule E” that adds the “[p]osition of
administrative law judge appointed under 5 U.S.C. 3105” to the previous categories of exempted positions.100 The Order also amends OPM
regulations to provide that appointments to positions exempted from
the competitive civil service “shall be made in accordance with such
95. Barnett, Against AJs, supra note 57.
96. Exec. Order No. 13,843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018). The Order “dramatically expand[ed] executive control over administrative adjudicators.” Paul R. Verkuil, Presidential Administration, the Appointment of ALJs, and the Future of For Cause Protection,
72 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 464 (2020).
97. Exec. Order No. 13,843, § 1. It also states that “Especially given the importance
of the functions they discharge . . . ALJs must display appropriate temperament, legal
acumen, impartiality, and sound judgment.” Id.
98. Id. But cf. Lubbers, supra note 94, at 747 (“Lucia did not raise those questions
at all.”).
99. Exec. Order No. 13,843, § 1. But cf. Verkuil, supra note 96, at 465 (arguing that
“E.O. 13,843’s reasoning that Lucia mandated agency control of ALJ selections seems
unpersuasive”).
100. Exec. Order No. 13,843, § 3(a)(i) (amending 5 C.F.R. § 6.2).
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regulations and practices as the head of the agency concerned finds
necessary.”101 Under the Order, the only required qualification for
new ALJs is that the applicant possess a professional license to practice law in a U.S. state or territory.102
The Order raises several intriguing legal questions, regarding its
consistency with statutory provisions concerning ALJ appointments,
the President’s authority to amend OPM regulations, and whether the
Order violates the APA.
a. Is Executive Order 13,843 Consistent with the APA?
The first issue highlights the history of § 3105, which authorizes
agencies to employ ALJs.103 As noted above, the original APA explicitly
specified that hearing examiners, as ALJs were then called, must be
selected using competitive civil service processes.104 Unless that requirement was unconstitutional, it would have precluded any executive order purporting to exempt hearing examiners from the competitive service appointments process. This explicit language was
omitted, however, when the APA was later recodified.105 Other civil
service safeguards for the independence of hearing examiners, including good-cause removal requirements, were retained or recodified
elsewhere,106 but there was no recodified statutory provision requiring that hearing examiners—or later ALJs—be appointed pursuant to
the competitive service process.107

101. Id. § 3(a)(ii) (amending 5 C.F.R. § 6.3(b)).
102. Id.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (“Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges
as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections
556 and 557 of this title. Administrative law judges shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable, and may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties
and responsibilities as administrative law judges.”).
104. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 11, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946) (originally codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 1010) (providing for appointment of examiners “[s]ubject to the civil-service . . .
laws”).
105. See Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 3105, 80 Stat. 378, 415 (1966) (recodifying 5 U.S.C.
§ 1010 as 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and omitting requirement of competitive civil service selection).
106. See Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 7521, 80 Stat. 378, 528 (1966) (enacting 5 U.S.C.
§ 7521).
107. The Civil Service Commission and later the OPM, however, promulgated regulations explicitly subjecting ALJs to the competitive hiring process. See 5 C.F.R.
§ 930.204(a) (2020) (“An agency may appoint an individual to an administrative law
judge position only with prior approval of OPM, except when it makes its selection
from the list of eligibles provided by OPM.”).
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This sort of statutory change would normally support a very
strong inference that Congress intended to remove any requirement
for competitive civil service selection, but the legislative history suggests that no such change was intended. Instead, the omission of this
language apparently reflected Congress’s assumption that an explicit
requirement was unnecessary because competitive civil service appointment would be the generally applicable default rule for federal
employees.108 Thus, an OPM trial attorney once argued to a congressional committee that “any persons appointed as administrative law
judges must still be qualified for such an appointment, and such appointments are still subject to the civil service and other laws not inconsistent with the APA.”109 This conclusion is supported by the recodification canon of statutory construction, under which changes in
statutory language as a result of comprehensive recodification do not
change prior law unless there is a clear intent to do so.110
Thus, there is a plausible argument that the omission of any statutory requirement for competitive civil service selection of ALJs from
§ 3105 does not authorize presidential or OPM actions to exempt ALJs
from competitive civil service selection. This sort of argument based
on legislative history and intent may have once been persuasive,111
but under the Supreme Court’s current approach to statutory interpretation, it is less likely to carry the day.112 Because the plain
108. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 note (“The words ‘Subject to the civil service’ are omitted
as unnecessary inasmuch as appointments are made subject to the civil service laws
unless specifically excepted.”); see also S. REP. NO. 89-1380, at 18 (1966) (“The purpose
of this bill is to restate in comprehensive form, without substantive change, the statutes
in effect before July 1, 1965, that relate to Government employees, the organization
and powers of Federal agencies generally, and administrative procedure[s] . . . .” (emphasis added)).
109. Administrative Law Judge Program of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the H. Comm. on Post Off. & Civ. Serv., 96th
Cong. 56–57 (1980) (OPM memorandum from Earl A. Sanders, OPM Trial Att’y, to Margery Waxman, Gen. Couns.); see also id. at 57 (“[B]ased on the philosophy expressed in
the reasons given for the omission of the references to the civil service and other consistent statutes, one can assume that the phrase was discarded as unnecessary: Congress did not intend that persons be appointed as administrative law judges or to any
other position who were unqualified and incompetent. The fact that the language and
organization of the APA provisions were altered in the codification of title 5 by P.L. 89554 does not alter their substance.”).
110. See RICHARD E. LEVY & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, STATUTORY ANALYSIS IN THE REGULATORY STATE 211 (2014) (discussing canons and citing cases).
111. See Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Loc. 134, Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 419
U.S. 428, 431 n.3 (1975) (“Slight modifications in [5 U.S.C. § 554] were made at the time
of codification, but no substantive changes were intended.” (first citing H.R. REP. NO.
89-901, at 3 (1965); and then citing S. REP. NO. 89-1380, at 18)).
112. See LEVY & GLICKSMAN, supra note 110, at 171–74 (discussing intentionalism-
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language of neither § 3105 nor any of the statutory provisions providing for competitive civil service requires competitive selection for
ALJs,113 it seems unlikely that a court would hold that the order violates the civil service laws.
b. May the President Amend OPM Regulations by Executive Order?
Assuming that § 3105 and other provisions do not require competitive civil service appointment of ALJs, the next question is whether
the President has the authority to amend OPM’s regulations by executive order.114 Ordinarily, we might doubt the authority of a President
to amend agency regulations because the authority to promulgate the
regulations is delegated to the agency rather than the President.115 In
the context of OPM and the competitive service, however, the relevant
statutes delegate rulemaking authority directly to the President and
include explicit authority to create exceptions to the competitive civil
service hiring process.116 In addition, OPM’s statutory authority to

textualism debate and the rise of textualism). But cf. Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife
Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1471 (2020) (reasoning that for “those who look to legislative
history to help interpret a statute,” the legislative history of the federal Clean Water
Act “strongly supports” the Court’s relatively narrow interpretation of EPA’s authority
to regulate discharges to groundwater).
113. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301–30e (provisions governing examination, certification,
and appointment).
114. See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10172, CAN A PRESIDENT AMEND
REGULATIONS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER? 1 (2018) (“Somewhat unusually, the order directly
amends three provisions in the CFR, rather than directing an agency to amend the regulations.”).
115. The President could, however, direct an executive agency to amend its regulations. See, e.g., Gingery v. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing President Clinton’s Executive Order 13,162, which directed the OPM to promulgate
regulations to promote the recruitment of “exceptional employees for careers in the
public sector”). In fulfilling such a presidential directive, the agency would have to
comply with the APA and so could not amend the regulation without following notice
and comment procedures or creating a sufficient record to support the substantive basis for agency action. See generally Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1669–86 (2019) (documenting numerous examples of Trump Administration regulatory actions that
violated APA procedural requirements and canvassing how those actions have fared
in court).
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 3301(1) (authorizing the President to “prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as
will best promote the efficiency of that service”); id. § 3302 (providing that “[t]he President may prescribe rules governing the competitive service . . . [which] shall provide,
as nearly as conditions of good administration warrant, for . . . (1) necessary exceptions of positions from the competitive service; and (2) necessary exceptions from the
provisions of section[] . . . 3304(a) . . . of this title”); see also id. § 3304(b) (“An
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adopt regulations is “subject to the rules prescribed by the President
. . . for the administration of the competitive service . . . .”117 Thus, previous Presidents have amended OPM regulations by executive order.118
Courts have generally upheld these executive orders as being
within the scope of the President’s delegated authority, albeit without
specifically addressing the authority to amend regulations directly. In
Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell,119 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that
President Ford had statutory authority to issue a regulation, 5 C.F.R.
§ 7.4, by means of Executive Order 11,935.120 This regulation, which
imposed a citizenship requirement for civil service employees, had a
complex procedural history. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,121 the Supreme Court invalidated a previous version of the regulation adopted
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), concluding that the CSC had
justified the regulation on the basis of foreign relations and immigration considerations that were beyond its purview.122 This limitation
individual may be appointed in the competitive service only if he has passed an examination or is specifically excepted from examination under section 3302 of this title.”).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 1302(a); see also 5 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2020) (providing that “[t]he Director,
Office of Personnel Management, shall promulgate and enforce regulations necessary
to carry out the provisions of the Civil Service Act, . . . the Civil Service Rules, and all
other statutes and Executive orders imposing responsibilities on the Office” (emphasis
added)). Indeed, OPM derives its authority to provide for civil service hiring from an
executive order. In 1954, President Eisenhower delegated his authority to adopt rules
implementing the Civil Service Act of 1883 to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Exec.
Order No. 10,577, Amending the Civil Service Rules and Authorizing a New Appointment System for the Competitive Service, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521 (Nov. 23, 1954). The CSC
was dissolved by the Civil Service Act of 1978, which transferred its authority to OPM
and MSPB. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Tigert, 53 F.3d 1289, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(describing Executive Order 10,577 as having delegated to OPM the authority to create
exceptions to competitive civil service examinations); see also Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 80 F.3d 796, 807 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Horner, 854 F.2d 490, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).
118. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,562, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,585 (Dec. 30, 2010) (creating
programs for hiring of recent graduates and amending 5 C.F.R. §§ 6.1(a), 6.2, 6.4, &
6.6); Exec. Order No. 12,300, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,683 (Mar. 26, 1981) (creating exemption
from competitive civil service for certain Department of Agriculture employees and
amending 5 C.F.R. § 6.8); Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (Sept. 3, 1976)
(creating citizenship requirement for civil service employees and adding 5 C.F.R. § 7.4).
119. 626 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 Fed.
Reg. 37,301 (Sept. 3, 1976), which added citizenship requirements to civil service qualifications).
120. 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (Sept. 3, 1976).
121. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
122. Id. at 116 (“In sum, assuming without deciding that the national interests
identified by the petitioners would adequately support an explicit determination by
Congress or the President to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service, we
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on valid agency considerations was not applicable to the President,
however.123 Thus, the court of appeals in Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell
read the Supreme Court’s decision as establishing the President’s authority to issue the rule:
Given the Court’s conclusion that the CSC was sufficiently empowered by the
delegation from the President to consider and issue a regulation incorporating a citizenship requirement (if the CSC could justify such a regulation with
a legitimate interest properly within its concern), it is clear that the President’s authority under 5 U.S.C. § 3301(1) to issue Executive Order No. 11935
can be no less valid since in that order the President is merely exercising the
authority that he had previously delegated to the CSC.124

Although the court of appeals did not explicitly address the validity of
the direct issuance of regulations by executive order, its conclusion
that the order was within the scope of the President’s authority necessarily implies that the issuance of regulations by executive order
was proper.125
c. Did Amendment of OPM Regulations Violate APA Procedures or
Constitute Arbitrary Decision-Making?
Assuming the President has the statutory authority to make direct revisions to civil service regulations, a third question is whether
Executive Order 13,843 violates the APA, either because it amended a
regulation without following notice and comment procedures or because it fails to provide an adequate explanation for the exemption
and is therefore arbitrary and capricious. Had the amendments included in the order been adopted by OPM, the agency would have had
to comply with APA notice and comment procedures, and it would
have had to provide a sufficient explanation, grounded in the
conclude that those interests cannot provide an acceptable rationalization for such a
determination by the Civil Service Commission.”).
123. See Mow Sun Wong, 626 F.2d at 743 (distinguishing Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong and outlining the President’s authority over such matters). Indeed, the court of
appeals agreed with the district court that “the dispute over the President’s power to
issue such order had already been decided in the affirmative by the Supreme Court
based on Congress’ delegation to the President in 5 U.S.C. § 3301(1).” Id. at 741–42.
124. Id. at 742–43. The President is authorized to “prescribe such regulations for
the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as will best
promote the efficiency of that service.” 5 U.S.C. § 3301(1).
125. See also Dean v. Dep’t of Lab., 808 F.3d 497, 499–500, 505–06 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(upholding Executive Order 13,562 against challenge based on veterans’ benefit statute without addressing the order’s inclusion of provisions directly amending regulations); Brunton v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 223, 228–29 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (denying
constitutional challenge to dismissal following reclassification of position so as to exempt it from civil service protections pursuant to Executive Order 12,300 without addressing validity of the order).
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rulemaking record, to pass muster under arbitrary and capricious review. It seems likely, however, that the APA would not apply because
the President is not an “agency” for purposes of the APA.126 Thus, Professor Lubbers concluded that although OPM’s regulations implementing President Trump’s executive order must follow notice and
comment procedures, the President is not required to do so.127 The
same reasoning suggests that Executive Order 13,843 is not subject to
judicial review under the APA.128 Thus, it seems unlikely that a legal
challenge to the order would be successful, regardless of whether the
challenge is based on violations of the civil service laws, presidential
authority to amend regulations, or compliance with the APA.129
d. Implications of the Order for ALJ Independence
Putting aside questions about the Order’s validity, its impact on
ALJ independence and impartiality is troubling. Because agencies are
no longer required to select ALJs based on competitive civil services

126. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992) (“The President is not
explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but he is not explicitly included, either. Out
of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the
President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the
provisions of the APA. We would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed
for abuse of discretion.”); accord Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994) (“The actions of the President . . . are not reviewable under the APA because, as we concluded
in Franklin, the President is not an ‘agency.’”).
127. Lubbers, supra note 94, at 751–52. Specifically, Professor Lubbers reasoned
that the APA’s general exemption from notice and comment procedures for rules relating to agency personnel, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), would not apply to OPM regulations
because the Civil Service Act explicitly requires OPM to follow notice and comment
rulemaking procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1). On the other hand, the President is exempt from APA requirements under Franklin. Accord BRANNON, supra note 114, at 3
(“Under Franklin v. Massachusetts, it appears that the President’s issuance of the executive order was not itself subject to the procedural requirements of the APA, even
though the President did exercise statutory authority to engage in rulemaking. But
when OPM acts to implement the President’s order, it will presumably be subject to
the APA, and if OPM (or any other executive agency) acts to create, amend, or repeal
any rules, it will likely have to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.”).
128. Indeed, this was the specific holding of Franklin. See supra note 126.
129. Although it is possible that other statutory or constitutional claims might be
advanced, it is unclear what they might be. In any event, it is also unclear who would
have standing to bring any claim challenging the order. A losing litigant in a proceeding
presided over by an ALJ appointed pursuant to the order might have standing to contest the means of appointment of that ALJ. On the question of whether ALJs would have
standing to litigate the legality of incursions on their decisional independence, see generally Nou, supra note 10, at 1189 (arguing that “the trend toward judicial dismissal of
ALJ suits based on [APA] is a salutary one”).
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processes designed to ensure selection of ALJs based on merit,130 the
program has been opened up “to potential cronyism or political favoritism in the hiring of new ALJs.”131 ALJs, in particular, have objected to
the order. Thus, the President of the Association of Administrative
Law Judges declared in an op-ed published in the Washington Post
that “as a result of the president’s executive order, an agency that
wants to employ an ALJ can recruit any attorney regardless of skill or
experience. Competence and impartiality apparently are no longer essential; cronyism and political interference will no longer be taboo.”132
Critics of the Order contend that “efforts to relocate ALJ positions
back to the centralized, apolitical hiring apparatus of the Competitive
Service, will be crucial to securing ALJ independence.”133 Those efforts
have already begun. Less than a month after President Trump signed
Executive Order 13,843, bipartisan legislation was introduced in Congress that would again require that agencies select ALJs from a list of
eligible candidates supplied by OPM.134 Senator Susan Collins, one of
the bill’s sponsors, explained that the bill was designed to ensure the
130. See, e.g., Daniel B. Listwa & Lydia K. Fuller, Note, Constraint Through Independence, 129 YALE L.J. 548, 560 (2019) (describing the Order’s intent as allowing agency
heads to “circumvent [the] apolitical, centralized process [for appointing civil servants] and instead directly appoint ALJs who meet agency-specific qualifications”).
131. Lubbers, supra note 94, at 748; see also Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 VAND. L. REV. 425, 486 n.262 (2019) (arguing
that Lucia and Executive Order 13,843 heighten the risk of “political capture of agency
adjudication”); Jack Beermann, The Future of Administrative Law Judge Selection,
REGUL. REV. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/10/29/beermann
-administrative-law-judge-selection [https://perma.cc/K4ZE-NHKJ] (arguing that
“moving the hiring process into the agencies themselves . . . presents the danger of politicization, especially since the Lucia decision mandates the involvement of agency
heads who are politically appointed,” and that politicization “could threaten the efficiency and perceived impartiality of the adjudicatory system,” generating a loss of public confidence whose “consequences could be disastrous”); Listwa & Fuller, supra note
130, at 606–07 (stating that “the long-term neutrality of agencies’ adjudicatory records
depends crucially on the incoming pipeline of those who build them”); Peter L. Strauss,
Preface, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 238 (2019) (asserting that the Order, “ostensibly
based on Lucia, appears to invite political hiring”).
132. Lubbers, supra note 94, at 748 (quoting Marilyn Zahm, Opinion, Do You Have
a Social Security Card? Then Take This Executive Order Personally, WASH. POST (July 18,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/do-you-have-a-social-security
-card-then-take-this-executive-order-personally/2018/07/18/4d66339c-89d6-11e8
-85ae-511bc1146b0b_story.html [https://perma.cc/JD2S-EE67]).
133. Listwa & Fuller, supra note 130, at 607.
134. E.g., S. 3887, 115th Cong. (2018). Nonetheless, according to the Congress.gov
bill tracker, no further action was taken on this bill. See S. 3387–A Bill to Restore Administrative Law Judges to the Competitive Service, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3387 [https://perma.cc/WCP4-FZV2].
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appointment of well-qualified, impartial ALJs through a nonpartisan
and fair process.135
B. REMOVAL
Although apolitical, merit-based selection is an important protection for ALJs’ adjudicatory independence, protections against removal
or other disciplinary action in retaliation for decisions in individual
cases are even more essential.136 As discussed above, the APA and civil
service laws protect against this sort of action by requiring “good
cause” for the removal of ALJs (or other disciplinary sanctions) and
providing for a neutral adjudicatory process before the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) when an agency seeks to do so.137 Like the
appointment of ALJs, however, these protections have been placed in
doubt by a combination of judicial decisions that have unsettled constitutional doctrine and executive action that has undermined the
good-cause requirement.138
1. Judicial Decisions and Good-Cause Removal Restrictions
Good-cause requirements for the removal of executive branch officials are central to the debate over the unitary executive. Although
the Supreme Court has recognized inherent presidential authority to
remove executive officers,139 it has upheld statutory provisions
135. Listwa & Fuller, supra note 130, at 606.
136. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (“If, as one must
take for granted, the War Claims Act precluded the President from influencing the
Commission in passing on a particular claim, a fortiori must it be inferred that Congress did not wish to have hang over the Commission the Damocles’ sword of removal
by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission
men of his own choosing.”).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (“An action may be taken against an administrative law
judge appointed under section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed only for good cause established and determined by the
Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the
Board.”).
138. See generally Kent Barnett, Regulating Impartiality in Agency Adjudication,
YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/
regulating-impartiality-in-agency-adjudication-by-kent-barnett [https://perma.cc/
3RW7-6MGX] (discussing conflict between Article II and due process concerns raised
by good-cause removal requirement for ALJs).
139. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (invalidating statute requiring Senate consent for the removal of a postmaster); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
726 (1986) (invalidating statutory provisions delegating executive power to the
Comptroller General, a legislative officer removable only by Congress, because “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment”).
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requiring good cause for the removal of officers, provided that such
requirements do not interfere with the essential functions of the President.140 These precedents, which accommodated the creation of independent agencies, provide support for the constitutionality of goodcause removal requirements for ALJs. Nonetheless, recent judicial decisions cast doubt on that conclusion, including Free Enterprise Fund
v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,141 Lucia v. SEC,142 and Seila
Law, LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,143 all of which narrow the permissible scope of good-cause removal provisions and cast
doubt on the validity of good-cause requirements for ALJs and their
superiors.
a. Dual Good-Cause Removal Provisions
First, the Court held in Free Enterprise Fund that two layers of
good-cause protection impermissibly interfered with the President’s
duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.144 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002145 created the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (the Board) to oversee regulation of accounting practices related to securities markets and vested the Board with rulemaking and enforcement authority.146 The Board’s five members are appointed by the SEC to staggered five-year terms,147 and the Act

140. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (upholding
statute limiting removal of commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
good cause and distinguishing Myers on the ground that the FTC was a “quasi legislative or quasi judicial agenc[y]” whose functions were not central to the President’s executive functions); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988) (upholding
statutory good-cause requirement for the Attorney General’s removal of independent
counsel even though the counsel’s functions were purely executive because the independent exercise of those functions did not interfere with “the President’s exercise of
the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the
laws be faithfully executed’” under Article II, § 3); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958) (reading silent statute to impose good-cause restriction on President’s power
to remove members of war claims tribunal acting in a quasi-judicial capacity because
presidential control might violate due process).
141. 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (invalidating second layer of good-cause removal protections for Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).
142. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (concluding that ALJs are officers of the United States
who must be appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
143. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (invalidating good-cause removal provisions for Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
144. 561 U.S. at 513–14 (2010).
145. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c)(2)–(4).
147. Id. § 7211(e)(1), (5).
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allowed the SEC to remove Board members only for good cause.148 An
accounting firm under investigation by the Board sought a declaratory
judgment that the Board was unconstitutional and an injunction
against further exercise of its powers, contending that the Act violated
the separation of powers by conferring extensive executive powers on
the Board that were not subject to Presidential control.149
The Supreme Court held that the Act’s dual good-cause removal
structure, under which the SEC could remove Board members only for
good cause and the President could remove members of the SEC only
for good cause, was unconstitutional.150 The Court reasoned that this
structure prevented the President from ensuring that the Board was
faithfully executing the laws because he could not hold either the
Board or the SEC accountable for the Board’s conduct.151 Thus, the
Court concluded that “this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts” and was therefore “incompatible
with the Constitution’s separation of powers.”152 The Court remedied
the violation by declaring the constraints on the SEC’s power to remove Board members unconstitutional and severing them from the
rest of the statute.153

148. Id. § 7211(e)(6).
149. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
150. Justice Breyer, joined by four other Justices, dissented from the decision in
Free Enterprise Fund. Id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He disagreed that the statute
significantly interfered with the President’s executive power or violated separation of
powers. In his view, the Court failed to show why two layers of good-cause restrictions
imposed any more serious limitations on presidential powers than one did. Id. at 525.
This point of course, might be a double-edged sword, insofar as it could just as easily
imply that a single layer of good cause protections is unconstitutional.
151. See id. at 495 (majority opinion) (concluding that the statute “not only protects Board members from removal except for good cause, but withdraws from the
President any decision on whether that good cause exists. That decision is vested instead in other tenured officers—the Commissioners—none of whom is subject to the
President’s direct control. The result is a Board that is not accountable to the President,
and a President who is not responsible for the Board.”); id. at 496 (“The Commissioners
are not responsible for the Board’s actions. They are only responsible for their own
determination of whether the Act’s rigorous good-cause standard is met. And even if
the President disagrees with their determination, he is powerless to intervene, unless
the SEC’s determination of lack of good cause to remove Board members is so unreasonable as to give rise to good cause to remove SEC members.”).
152. Id. at 498.
153. Id. at 509 (explaining that this relief “leaves the President separated from
Board members by only a single level of good-cause tenure. The Commission is then
fully responsible for the Board’s actions, which are no less subject than the Commission’s own functions to Presidential oversight.”).
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The Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund has obvious implications for ALJs who serve in independent agencies, insofar as such arrangements involve two layers of good-cause removal.154 Recognizing
this potential concern, the Court stated in a footnote that “our holding . . . does not address that subset of independent agency employees
who serve as administrative law judges.”155 It offered several possible
reasons why dual good-cause removal provisions for ALJs might be
distinguishable, including uncertainty about their status as officers of
the United States, their performance of adjudicatory (rather than policymaking) functions, and their possession in some instances of
“purely recommendatory powers.”156
These points, however, are not especially convincing for three
reasons.157 Lucia, of course, subsequently held that SEC ALJs are
154. Indeed, most ALJs serve in independent agencies. In particular, the SSA—
which employs more ALJs than all other agencies combined—is headed by a commissioner whom the President may remove only for good cause. See 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1),
(3) (providing that the Commissioner of the SSA serves for a six-year term and “may
be removed from office only pursuant to a finding by the President of neglect of duty
or malfeasance”); ALJs by Agency, OPM, https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/
administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency [https://perma.cc/WUU9-VSZY]
(reporting that, as of March 2017, the SSA employed 1,655 of 1,931 ALJs employed by
the federal government). A number of other independent agencies whose members
are subject to good-cause removal restrictions also employ ALJs, including the Federal
Communications Commission, FTC, National Labor Relations Board, Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission, and SEC. Id. It is not entirely clear whether the
relevant superior in this context is the agency that employs the ALJ or the MSPB, but
that would not significantly affect the analysis because the MSPB’s members can only
be removed for good cause under 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d). See Listwa & Fuller, supra note
130, at 550 (observing that this structure “insulates ALJs, at least to some extent, from
the influences of their respective agencies’ political appointees”).
155. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10. The Court also professed not to decide
whether members of “the civil service system within independent agencies” are distinguishable from the Board members at issue in Free Enterprise Fund, id. at 507, but
under Executive Order 13,843, ALJs are no longer part of the competitive civil service
(except for incumbent ALJs as of July 10, 2018, who will remain in the competitive service as long as they remain in their current positions), Exec. Order No. 13,843,
§ 3(a)(iv), Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed.
Reg. 32,755, 32,757 (July 13, 2018). Nonetheless, Justice Breyer estimated that the
Court’s decision put the job security of hundreds or thousands of government officials,
including ALJs, constitutionally at risk. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507, 542–43
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Court Should Change the Scope of the Removal Power by Adopting a Purely Functional
Approach, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657 (2019) (arguing that the Court should allow goodcause removal provisions for officers who adjudicate disputes between individuals
and the government but not those who make policy).
157. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, “You’re Fired!” Why the ALJ Multi-Track Dual Removal
Provisions Violate the Constitution and Possible Fixes, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 705 (2019)
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officers of the United States, eliminating that distinction.158 Most adjudications include an element of policy discretion, and many agencies, like the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), use precedential
adjudications to make policy.159 Finally, most ALJs are empowered to
render final decisions unless the agency or an appellate body within
the agency grants review.160 The constitutionality of dual good-cause
removal provisions for ALJs in independent agencies thus remains in
doubt.161 In Duka v. SEC,162 for example, the district court relied on the
Supreme Court’s footnote in Free Enterprise Fund to uphold dual goodcause removal requirements for ALJs, but that decision was abrogated
on appeal on jurisdictional grounds. Conversely, the Solicitor General,
in briefs subsequently filed in Lucia, urged the Court to invalidate the
good-cause removal restrictions on ALJs, thereby allowing agency
heads to remove them at will.163 Lucia, however, declined to address
the issue.164
(arguing that good-cause removal provisions for ALJs in both independent and executive agencies are invalid).
158. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).
159. See GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 36, at 523. The Association of Administrative Law Judges takes the position that administrative adjudications of disability
claims under the Social Security Act are not precedential. See Letter from Judge Gabrielle Vitellio & Penny Loucas to authors 22 (May 28, 2020) [hereinafter AALJ Letter] (on
file with authors) (noting that “SSA has argued in formal proceedings that ALJs do not
make policy. It is the position of the AALJ that the ALJs who are not management officials at SSA do no[sic] make policy.”). The AALJ “is a union that . . . represents . . . administrative law judges in collective bargaining . . . pursuant to the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act.” Ass’n of Admin. L. Judges v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 403 (7th Cir.
2015).
160. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“When the presiding employee makes an initial decision,
that decision then becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by
rule.”). In particular, SSA ALJs enter final decisions unless the Appeals Council grants
review. See, e.g., Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2019) (concluding that
SSA decision denying benefits was a final decision when the Appeals Council dismissed
the claimant’s petition for review as untimely).
161. The Fifth Circuit, for example, enjoined an adjudication before an SEC ALJ until it has resolved the constitutionality of the ALJ’s protection from at-will removal. See
Barnett, Impartiality, supra note 82, at 1695 (citing Cochran v. SEC, No. 19-10396 (5th
Cir. Sept. 24, 2019), https://nclalegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/19-10396
_Documents-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA8Z-9DHU].
162. 103 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated on jurisdictional grounds, 824
F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016). The district court reasoned that (1) ALJs do not have enforcement or policy discretion of the kind that the President must control; and (2) allowing
presidential control was incompatible with due process in agency adjudications. Id. at
395–96.
163. See Lubbers, supra note 94, at 754–56.
164. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 n.1 (2018) (“In [its] certiorari-stage brief,
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If dual good-cause removal provisions for ALJs are improper,
then it is important to determine whether the relevant principal officer is the agency that employs the ALJ or the MSPB, which adjudicates removal and other disciplinary action. If the relevant principal is
the agency itself, then the dual good-cause problem arises only if the
agency head is also subject to good cause removal, like the SEC or the
SSA. If, on the other hand, the relevant principal is the MSPB, whose
members are removable only for good cause, then all ALJs are subject
to dual good-cause removal provisions.165 Since the vast majority of
ALJs are employed by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and
other independent agencies,166 the issue of whether the principal is
the agency or the MSPB for purposes of the Free Enterprise Fund rule
matters only for a relatively small number of ALJs employed by executive agencies.167
Whether the principal is the employing agency or the MSPB is
also relevant to the proper remedy in the event that dual good-cause
removal provisions for ALJs are invalid. In Free Enterprise Fund, the
Court severed the Public Company Accounting Board’s good-cause
protections, leaving the good-cause removal requirements for the SEC
intact.168 As noted above, the Solicitor General proposed a similar
remedy in Lucia, which would allow the SEC to remove ALJs at will.169
An alternative remedy, however, would be to sever the good-cause removal requirements for the superior agency. Thus, in Bandimere v.
SEC, a concurring judge suggested that any dual good-cause removal
the Government asked us to add a second question presented: whether the statutory
restrictions on removing the Commission’s ALJs are constitutional. When we granted
certiorari, we chose not to take that step. The Government’s merits brief now asks us
again to address the removal issue. We once more decline. No court has addressed that
question, and we ordinarily await ‘thorough lower court opinions to guide our analysis
of the merits.’” (citations omitted)). For further discussion of the Solicitor General’s
position on good-cause removal for ALJs, see infra notes 188–96 and accompanying
text (discussing Guidance Memorandum seeking to weaken good-cause protections).
165. See Jellum, supra note 157, at 743 (arguing that because ALJs in executive
agencies are protected by the MSPB, they are subject to dual good-cause removal protections that violate Free Enterprise Fund).
166. See supra note 154.
167. It is, however, pending before the D.C. Circuit in a case involving ALJs in the
Department of Agriculture. Fleming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 17-1246 (D.C. Cir. filed
Nov. 16, 2017); see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Collision Between the Constitution of the
1930s and the Constitution of 2020, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-collision-between-the-constitution-of-the-1930s
-and-the-constitution-of-2020-by-richard-j-pierce-jr [https://perma.cc/3QUD-4JMP]
(stating that it is unclear whether Free Enterprise Fund applies to ALJs).
168. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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issues for SEC ALJs could be remedied by severing the MSPB’s goodcause removal requirements (as opposed to the SEC’s).170
We think that the principal officer is the head of the employing
agency, not the MSPB. The applicable statute provides that “[a]n action may be taken against an administrative law judge . . . by the agency
in which the administrative law judge is employed only for good cause
established and determined by the [MSPB] on the record after opportunity for hearing before the Board.”171 This provision indicates that
the employing agency initiates the action to remove an ALJ; the MSPB
has no authority to do so. In this respect, the MSPB acts as an independent check on the existence of good cause, in much the same way
that a court would act as a check on the termination of an employee
who files a wrongful termination suit.
In any event, if having two layers of good-cause removal for ALJs
is a violation of the President’s removal power, a court would have to
determine whether to invalidate the good-cause removal provision
for ALJs,172 or to sever good-cause removal requirements for the
agency head.173 The first option would seriously compromise the principal of independent and impartial agency adjudication under the APA
by exposing ALJs to removal in retaliation for decisions in particular
cases that contravene the wishes of their politically appointed superiors. The second option would eliminate the independence of agencies
such as the SEC, the NLRB, or the SSA, a fundamental alteration that
Congress likely would not have intended.174 Removing the
170. In Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied, 855
F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2017), for example, the Tenth Circuit held (before Lucia) that SEC
ALJs were inferior officers whose appointments violated the Appointments Clause. A
dissenting judge expressed concern that this holding would jeopardize for-cause removal provisions for ALJs under Free Enterprise Fund. See id. at 1200 (McKay, J., dissenting) (“When understood in conjunction with Free Enterprise Fund, I worry today’s
opinion will be used to strip ALJs of their dual layer for-cause protection.”). In response, a concurring judge suggested that the problem could be cured by “rendering
the [Merit Systems Protection Board’s] three members removable by the President at
will.” Id. at 1191 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (emphasis added). Section 7521(b)(1) defines “action” to
include “a removal.” Id. § 7521(b)(1).
172. Id. § 7521.
173. Cf. Jellum, supra note 157, at 745–50 (examining possible fixes for the unconstitutional dual good-cause removal provisions for ALJs, including invalidating § 7521
but leaving “less robust” civil service protections in place, narrowing Humphrey’s Executor to adjudicatory bodies, and overruling Humphrey’s Executor so as to prevent
good-cause removal restrictions from being imposed on principal officers).
174. For those who believe that independent agencies are unconstitutional, however, eliminating good-cause removal protections for the Board and similar agencies
would be a salutary result. See, e.g., In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
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independence of the employing agency, moreover, might indirectly
undermine the effectiveness of good-cause removal protections for
ALJs by increasing the likelihood that agency officials will put political
pressure on ALJs.175
b. Good-Cause Removal Provisions and the Appointments Clause
Lucia creates another uncertainty about the constitutionality of
good-cause removal provisions for ALJs. Once it is determined that
ALJs are officers of the United States, the validity of their appointment
by agency heads depends on whether they are principal or inferior officers.176 Although the assumption appears to be that ALJs qualify as
inferior officers,177 that conclusion may depend on whether they are
subject to good-cause removal provisions. This possibility is reflected
in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,178 a recent decision in which
the Federal Circuit concluded that Administrative Patent Judges
(APJs) are principal officers because they are not subordinate to a superior officer beneath the President. The court reasoned that “[t]he
lack of any presidentially-appointed officer who can review, vacate, or
correct decisions by the APJs combined with the limited removal
power lead us to conclude . . . that [APJs] are principal officers.”179 The
court severed the good-cause removal provision so as to convert them
into inferior officers.180
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (observing that as a result of Humphrey’s Executor, the
President lacked “day-to-day control over large swaths of regulatory policy and enforcement in the Executive Branch,” resulting in independent agencies that are “democratically unaccountable—neither elected by the people nor supervised in their dayto-day activities by the elected President”).
175. See infra notes 188–96 and accompanying text (discussing efforts to weaken
good-cause removal protections for ALJs so as to give agencies greater control over
their decisions).
176. Pursuant to the Appointments Clause, a principal officer may only be appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent, while Congress may provide
for appointment of an inferior officer by the President alone, the courts, or the head of
a department. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
177. Thus, for example, the Solicitor General’s post-Lucia guidance states that “all
ALJs and similarly situated administrative judges should be appointed as inferior officers under the Appointments Clause.” Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2.
178. 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Another case, Intercollegiate Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012), which the Arthrex court relied on, had reached the same result with respect to Copyright Royalty
Judges (CRJs). See id. at 1339 (“We find that, given the CRJs’ nonremovability and the
finality of their decisions . . . the Librarian’s and Register’s supervision functions still
fall short of the kind that would render the CRJs inferior officers.”).
179. 941 F.3d at 1335.
180. Id. at 1335–38; accord Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1340 (“We . . .
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A similar argument might apply to ALJs, even though their decisions (unlike the decisions of APJs) are subject to de novo review
within the agency. This distinction applies whether or not those decisions are purely recommendatory or may go into effect if not reversed
by the agency for which the ALJ conducted the adjudication.181 Given
that agencies review a relatively small percentage of ALJ decisions and
are constrained in their review by limited resources, however, the
availability of de novo agency review may be insufficient to justify the
conclusion that ALJs are inferior officers.182 If not, a court might invalidate good-cause removal for ALJs so as to avoid an Appointments
Clause violation.
c.

The Future of Good-Cause Removal Provisions

A final issue concerns whether good-cause removal restrictions
on ALJs are themselves constitutional, independently of any dual
good-cause removal problem or any concerns over their implications
conclude here that invalidating and severing the restrictions on the Librarian’s ability
to remove the CRJs eliminates the Appointments Clause violation and minimizes any
collateral damage.”).
The interplay between the statutory removal provisions and the Appointments
Clause poses a Hobson’s choice between politicizing ALJ appointments and exposing
ALJs to retaliatory removal. The courts in Arthrex and Intercollegiate Broadcasting invalidated statutory good-cause removal provisions, thereby exposing APJs and CRJs in
those cases to retaliatory removal, in order to convert the officers in those cases into
inferior officers whose appointment could be vested in the President, the heads of departments, or the courts. Retaining good-cause removal protections, however, might
mean that the officers involved would be principal officers, thus invalidating appointment by any means other than presidential appointment with Senate consent and exposing the appointment process to politicization.
181. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
182. In fiscal year 2018, for example, the Social Security Appeals Council reviewed
less than twenty percent of all ALJ decisions. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FY 2020 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 174 (2019), https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY20Files/FY20-JEAC_
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL5C-CLQL] (reporting that there were 562,452 ALJ decisions and 106,575 Appeals Council Decisions in that year). The same may be true of
agency adjudicators who are not administrative law judges protected by the APA’s decisional independence provisions. For example, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), which is housed within the Department of Justice, must refer to the Attorney
General all cases which the Attorney General wishes to review, as well as those which
the Chairman of the Board or a majority of the Board believes should be referred to the
Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2019). Cf. Leonard Birdsong, Reforming the
Immigration Courts of the United States: Why Is There No Will to Make It an Article I
Court?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 17, 25 (2013) (“The BIA has never been recognized by congressional statute; it is entirely a creature of the Attorney General’s regulations, and
the Attorney General appoints its members.”). In recent decades, more than 20,000
persons were granted asylum in the United States each year, id. at 26, making review
of each case by the Attorney General impractical.
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for the proper means of appointment. Until recently, there appeared
to be little doubt on this issue, but Seila Law, the Court’s most recent
decision on good-cause removal provisions, suggests that all goodcause removal provisions may be constitutionally suspect.183
The narrow issue in Seila Law was the validity of good-cause removal provision for the head of an agency who is a single individual.184
After then-Judge Kavanaugh advanced the proposition that this arrangement violated Article II by giving too much power to a single individual who was beyond presidential control, this issue had divided
the lower courts.185 It should come as no surprise that, after joining
the Court, Justice Kavanaugh would cast the crucial fifth vote to invalidate good-cause removal protections for the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
The majority reasoned that its prior decisions in Humphrey’s Executor186 and Morrison187 did not support the good cause removal provisions at issue.188 In so doing, the Court embraced a strong unitary
executive theory under which the President’s power to remove officers “at will” is the default rule and any departures from it must be specially justified and narrowly construed.189 The exception in Humphrey’s Executor was limited to multimember quasi-legislative and
183. Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
184. Id. at 2191.
185. First, Judge Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion for a panel decision
that invalidated the good-cause removal provision for the CFPB, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), but that decision was reversed by
the circuit sitting en banc. 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Fifth Circuit, however, invalidated a single director good-cause removal provision in Collins v. Mnuchin, 938
F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (reinstating 896 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2018)). Although
the Fifth Circuit purported to distinguish the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
from the CFPB, so as to reconcile its decision with the en banc decision in PHH, these
distinctions were unpersuasive, and the Collins court relied heavily on Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent from that decision. See 896 F.3d at 659–75. The Ninth Circuit followed the en banc decision, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila L. LLC, 923 F.3d 680
(9th Cir. 2019), and the Supreme Court granted review.
186. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding good-cause
removal restrictions for FTC commissioners).
187. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding good-cause removal restrictions on the independent counsel).
188. Seila L., 140 S. Ct. at 2200–01.
189. Id. at 2197–98 (discussing history and precedent supporting “President’s prerogative to remove executive officials,” characterizing Free Enterprise Fund as “adher[ing] to the general rule that the President possesses ‘the authority to remove those
who assist him in carrying out his duties,’” and describing Humphrey’s Executor and
Morrison as “exceptions to the President’s unrestricted removal power”); see also id. at
2205 (rejecting more “modest” view of the President’s removal power advanced by
defenders of the CFPB).
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quasi-judicial bodies190 and the exception in Morrison was limited to
low-level inferior officers without policy discretion.191 The CFPB Director did not fall under the Humphrey’s Executor exception because
the office is filled by a single individual (rather than a nonpartisan
body of experts) and the Director “is hardly a mere legislative or judicial aid.”192 The Director did not fall under the Morrison exception because “[e]veryone agrees the CFPB Director is not an inferior officer”
and the Director “has the authority to bring the coercive power of the
state to bear on millions of private citizens and businesses, imposing
even billion-dollar penalties through administrative adjudications
and civil actions.”193
The Court thus framed the question as “whether to extend those
precedents to the ‘new situation’ before us, namely an independent
agency led by a single Director and vested with significant executive
power.”194 This the Court declined to do, concluding that “[s]uch an
agency has no basis in history and no place in our constitutional structure.”195 In so doing, the Court concluded that the lack of historical
analogies was a strong indicator that the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional, rejecting several purportedly analogous agencies advanced by the CFPB’s defenders, including the SSA.196 The Court then
engaged in extensive textual and historical defense of a strong unitary
executive principal, concluding that:
The resulting constitutional strategy is straightforward: divide power everywhere except for the Presidency, and render the President directly accountable to the people through regular elections. In that scheme, individual executive officials will still wield significant authority, but that authority remains
subject to the ongoing supervision and control of the elected President.197

Finally, the Court rejected several other arguments advanced in defense of the good-cause removal provision, observing that the lack of
190. Id. at 2199 (“In short, Humphrey’s Executor permitted Congress to give forcause removal protections to a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan
lines, that performed legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any
executive power.”).
191. Id. at 2200 (describing Morrison as reflecting an exception for “inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority”). The Court
in Seila Law also cited United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (upholding goodcause removal restrictions on naval cadet-engineer), as falling within this exception.
See Seila L., 140 S. Ct. at 2199.
192. Id. at 2200.
193. Id. at 2200–01.
194. Id. at 2201.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 2201–02.
197. Id. at 2203.
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explicit textual support in Article II for the removal power was not
material because separation of powers principles are derived from the
structure of the Constitution rather than its text,198 rejecting a more
modest version of the President’s removal power that permitted congressional restrictions on removal as inconsistent with the unitary executive,199 and concluding that a broad construction of the grounds for
removal could not save the statute under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.200 Having found the good-cause removal provision
to be invalid, the Court severed the provision so as to permit the President to remove the CFPB Director “at will.”201
The holding of Seila Law has important implications for the SSA,
which employs the vast majority of ALJs, and its reasoning may cast
doubt on the validity of any good-cause removal provisions for ALJs.
Most directly, the holding and analysis in Seila Law suggest that the
good-cause removal provision for the SSA Commissioner is probably
invalid.202 Like the Director of the CFPB, the Commissioner of Social
Security is a single individual who is a principal officer at the head of
an agency with broad governmental power. Indeed, the Court in Seila
Law rejected the Commissioner of Social Security as historical precedent for the CFPB Director in part because the good-cause removal
provision for the Commissioner was controversial and “President
Clinton contested [its] constitutionality.”203 On the other hand, the
Court also distinguished the SSA from the CFPB, observing that “unlike
the CFPB, the SSA lacks the authority to bring enforcement actions
against private parties. Its role is largely limited to adjudicating claims
for Social Security benefits.”204 Thus, the Court sent mixed signals as
to the constitutionality of the good-cause removal requirement for the
198. See id. at 2205 (explaining that “foundational doctrines” like federalism and
separation of powers are “evident from the Constitution’s vesting of certain powers in
certain bodies” and that the “President’s removal power stems from Article II’s vesting
of the ‘executive Power’ in the President”).
199. See id. at 2205–06 (rejecting argument that precedents permit Congress to
regulate presidential removal provided that Congress does not reserve a role for itself
in the removal process and does not eliminate the President’s power to remove officers
altogether).
200. See id. at 2206–07 (concluding that the statute was clear and could not support an alternative construction).
201. See id. at 2207–11 (concluding that the good-cause removal provision was
severable).
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (“An individual serving in the office of Commissioner
may be removed from office only pursuant to a finding by the President of neglect of
duty or malfeasance in office.”).
203. 140 S. Ct. at 2202.
204. Id.

80

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:39

SSA Commissioner. Nonetheless, Seila Law’s reasoning would suggest
the provision is constitutionally invalid unless the Court is prepared
to recognize a new exception to the President’s authority to remove
executive officers at will. If the good-cause removal provision for the
SSA Commissioner is invalid, that result would—somewhat paradoxically—moot the issue of dual good-cause removal for the vast majority of ALJs because although SSA ALJs would still be subject to goodcause removal protections, the SSA Commissioner would not.205 This
conclusion assumes that the principal officer for SSA ALJs is the Commissioner, rather than the MSPB.206
The reasoning of Seila Law, however, has broader implications
for good-cause removal provisions as applied to ALJs in general and
without regard to whether they are supervised by a principal officer
subject to good-cause removal provisions. Insofar as Seila Law reasoned that presidential removal at will is the rule, and good-cause restrictions are the exceptions,207 good-cause limitations on ALJs may
violate Article II. At the very least, defenders of good-cause protections for ALJ independence must establish that these positions fall
within the recognized exceptions based on Humphrey’s Executor and
Morrison or persuade the Court to recognize a new exception for
ALJs.208 Insofar as ALJs are inferior officers who lack policymaking authority and function in a quasi-judicial capacity, they may fall within
either or both of those exceptions as defined in Seila Law.209 Likewise,
the due process implications of allowing ALJs to be removed at will
might justify recognizing a new exception.210 Even if the Court ultimately rebuffs a constitutional challenge to good-cause removal protections for ALJs, the language and reasoning of Seila Law would seem
to lend support to the Solicitor General’s guidance, discussed in the
following section, under which good-cause protections for ALJs
should be read to allow a broader measure of presidential control.

205. Such a result would, however, make Social Security ALJs more vulnerable to
political pressure, especially if the President succeeds in weakening good-cause removal requirements. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
207. 140 S. Ct. at 2205.
208. Id. at 2192.
209. Id.
210. There may also be a stronger historical case for ALJ independence. The APA
itself has been in place since 1946, and there may be earlier examples of good-cause
protection for quasi-judicial officers.
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2. Executive Action to Weaken Good-Cause Removal Requirements
for ALJs
Just as the uncertainty surrounding ALJ appointments created by
Lucia sparked President Trump’s Executive Order exempting ALJs
from competitive civil-service hiring, the uncertainties surrounding
good-cause removal provisions for federal officers has fueled the
Trump Administration’s efforts to weaken good-cause protections for
ALJs.211 In particular, the Solicitor General issued guidance indicating
that the Justice Department will defend against challenges to ALJ
good-cause removal requirements only if these provisions are construed to allow agency heads to exercise sufficient control over
ALJs.212
Citing Free Enterprise Fund, the Guidance Memorandum states
that “[t]he Constitution not only specifies the manner in which officers
of the United States must be appointed, but also limits the extent to
which officers may permissibly be shielded from removal by the Department Head.”213 It then observes that “[m]any litigants have already argued that ALJs are impermissibly shielded from removal” by
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a), and that “[w]e expect more such challenges in the
wake of Lucia.”214 The Guidance Memorandum then sets forth the Justice Department’s position regarding the defense of § 7521(a) against
such challenges:
The Department of Justice is prepared to defend the constitutionality of
Section 7521, as properly construed. As the government argued in the Supreme Court in Lucia, Section 7521’s “good cause” standard for removal is
properly read to allow for removal of an ALJ who fails to perform adequately
or to follow agency policies, procedures, or instructions . . . . An ALJ cannot,
however, be removed for any invidious reason or to influence the outcome in
a particular adjudication. As so construed, and provided MSPB review is suitably deferential to the determination of the Department Head, the Department
of Justice will argue that Section 7521 gives the President a constitutionally

211. See Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5.
212. See id. Although the Guidance Memorandum is labeled as “Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work Product,” it is sufficiently public to be available on Internet
sites, including Reuters, and has been discussed in scholarly literature. See id.; Listwa
& Fuller, supra note 130, at 560 & n.56 (describing the memorandum’s contention that
the MSPB must be “suitably deferential” to agency heads as “[i]n line with [a] strong
reading of Lucia”); Lubbers, supra note 94, at 757–58 (criticizing memorandum’s treatment of good-cause removal); Guidance on Administrative Law Judges After Lucia v. SEC
(S.Ct.), July 2018, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (2019) [hereinafter Harvard Guidance Note]
(describing memorandum in detail and offering various criticisms).
213. Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5.
214. Id. Such challenges are even more likely to proliferate after Seila Law.
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adequate degree of control over ALJs. This is true of ALJs who work at independent agencies, as well as ALJs at traditional Executive Branch agencies.215

Several features of this passage are worth highlighting.
First, although Free Enterprise Fund only held that dual goodcause removal requirements were constitutionally invalid, the Guidance Memorandum makes no effort to differentiate between ALJs employed by executive and independent agencies, suggesting instead
that Department Heads must be able to exercise control over ALJs.216
In this respect, the Guidance Memorandum’s analysis would apply
equally to other good-cause removal provisions, including those of
traditional independent agencies, such as the FTC, the NLRB, or the
SEC.
Second, although the Guidance Memorandum acknowledges that
ALJs could not be removed “for any invidious reason or to influence
the outcome in a particular adjudication,” the Solicitor General asserts
that agencies must be able to remove an ALJ who “fails . . . to follow
agency policies, procedures, or instructions.”217 As we discuss more
fully below, this language would place ALJs in an untenable position
when agencies adopt informal policies or issue instructions that appear to conflict with statutes and regulations.218

215. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). As reflected in this passage, the Solicitor General advanced this position in much greater detail in Lucia. See Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 39–55, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No.
17-130) (arguing that “[s]tatutory restrictions on removal of the Commission’s ALJs
must be narrowly construed in light of serious separation of powers concerns”). For a
critical discussion of this passage, see Harvard Guidance Note, supra note 212, at 1127
(“[T]he proposed removal procedures are substantially more deferential to agency
leadership than current practice is and provide little guidance as to what justifications
for removal might be unacceptable. These changes bolster presidential control over
administrative officials and lend credence to Justice Breyer’s worry that Lucia could be
used to weaken the independence of adjudicators.” (footnote omitted)). See also
Verkuil, supra note 96, at 469 (“By requiring removal restrictions to be deferential to
the executive authority, [the Solicitor General’s Guidance Memorandum] challenges
established statutory schemes.”).
216. Indeed, the reference to a “Department Head” would surely include executive
departments that employ ALJs, even though there is no dual good-cause removal problem in those agencies. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 656–57 (1988) (upholding
statute limiting the Attorney General’s power to remove for good cause). Free Enterprise Fund, of course, distinguished Morrison precisely because it involved only one
layer of good cause. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
495 (2010) (“Morrison did not, however, address the consequences of more than one
level of good-cause tenure . . . .”).
217. Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5.
218. See infra notes 233–63 and accompanying text (discussing history of SSA
pressure on ALJs).
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Third, the Guidance Memorandum’s position undermines the
role of the MSPB as an independent check on the removal of ALJs. Degrees of deference affect the allocation of decision-making authority
between an initial decision-maker and a reviewing body. Thus, requiring the MSPB to defer to the agency decision regarding the removal of
ALJs takes decision-making authority away from the MSPB and gives
it to the agency. This result appears to be contrary to the plain language of § 7521(a), which requires good cause to be “established and
determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board . . . .”219
In short, the Guidance Memorandum represents an especially
strong assertion of the unitary executive principle in which Article II’s
demands for presidential control of executive officers outweigh the
need to protect the procedural due process rights of parties to administrative adjudications by ensuring the impartiality and independence
of adjudicatory officials. Under this view, although ALJs are called
“judges,” they are first and foremost executive officers whose duty is
to carry out the policy of the political leaders of the agency. Thus, it is
hardly surprising that the commentary on the Guidance Memorandum has largely been critical.220 Nonetheless, the Court’s analysis in
Seila Law suggests that a majority of Justices may be receptive to the
Solicitor General’s position.

219. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (emphasis added); see Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980,
988–89 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that statutory delegation to Tax Court of authority
“to determine the appropriate relief” indicated that Tax Court had authority to make a
de novo determination of eligibility for equitable relief without deference to the IRS
Appeals Officer). Although the constitutional avoidance doctrine might justify a narrow construction, it cannot be used to reach a result that is contrary to the plain and
unambiguous language of the statute. See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830,
843 (2018) (“That is not how the canon of constitutional avoidance works. Spotting a
constitutional issue does not give a court the authority to rewrite a statute as it pleases.
Instead, the canon permits a court to ‘choos[e] between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text.’” (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005))).
220. In addition to the commentary cited supra in note 212 (citing commentary on
the Guidance Memorandum), see Kevin D. Collins, Administrative Hearings: Executive
Power and the Administrative State, 2019 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. SPECIAL INST. ON
NAT. RES. DEV. & ADMIN. STATE *12-7, which concludes that “[t]he Department of Justice’s change in position during the Lucia appeal and efforts to address removal of ALJs
demonstrates an effort by the Trump Administration to assert greater executive control over administrative courts”; and Michael Devine & Erin Wirth, ALJ Independence
Under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Lucia v. SEC, 58 JUDGES’ J. 6, 9 (2019), which describes Guidance Memorandum
as “an effort to redefine ‘good cause’ to . . . allow much greater control by the executive
branch and agency heads” which “would have the effect of transforming them into atwill employees, diminishing their independence in direct contradiction to the language
and intent of the APA” (footnote omitted).
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C. ALJ INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIAL DECISION-MAKING
The purpose of ALJ independence in general, and of competitive
hiring and good-cause protection for ALJs in particular, is to ensure
that ALJs will conduct adjudications impartially.221 Thus, the ultimate
question raised by the developments described above is whether
those developments open the door to improper agency influence that
could undermine the fairness of ALJ decisions.222 Drawing the proper
balance between Article II oversight and adjudicatory independence
is not a new problem; it has been a contested issue since the dawn of
the administrative state. Whatever the agency’s legitimate interest in
ALJ oversight, however, it does not include interference with the impartiality of agency adjudications.
1. Improper Influence
To assess the problem of improper influence, we might differentiate between presidential or agency interference in the outcome of a
particular case and systemic influence to drive outcomes in a preferred direction.223 Agencies, of course, may decide cases heard by
ALJs de novo through the normal adjudicatory process, and they may
adopt policies that bind ALJs through rulemaking and precedential adjudications. Aside from these legitimate processes, there is little doubt
that it would be improper for the President or an agency to direct an
ALJ to decide a particular case in a particular way. The question of systemic influence is a more complex one, as the line between legitimate

221. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (directing ALJs to conduct proceedings under §§ 556 and
557 “in an impartial manner”).
222. See, e.g., Barnett, Impartiality, supra note 82, at 1697–98 (arguing that Lucia
triggers “concern over ALJs’ insulation” and “undermines [their] . . . appearance of impartiality” by raising the possibility that supervising officials can remove them at will);
Lubbers, supra note 94, at 752–53 (“Although Executive Order 13,843’s establishment
of an almost unrestricted selection process for ALJs can be seen as an indirect dilution
of their independence, even more concerning is the seeming campaign by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to weaken ALJs’ for-cause protection from discipline and removal.”).
223. For example, a decision-maker might have a financial conflict of interest in a
particular case (e.g., by owning stock in one of the parties) or in the outcomes of cases
generally (such as when an insurance company decides question of coverage). Compare Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 868–69, 873 (2009) (finding improper conflict of interest where elected state supreme court justice had received millions of dollars in campaign funding from one of the parties), with Schweiker v.
McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 188–89 (1982) (finding no improper conflict of interest when
Medicare fiscal intermediaries decided coverage questions because claims were paid
by Medicare, not the fiscal intermediary).
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agency policy and illegitimate influence that compromises ALJ impartiality is a difficult one to draw.
The possibility that the politicization of appointments and weakening of good-cause removal requirements will open the door to improper influence in individual cases cannot be discounted.224 Nonetheless, this concern does not strike us as the most serious problem
with the erosion of ALJ independence. Neither the precedents nor the
executive actions discussed above suggest that the President or
agency heads have the power to appoint and remove ALJs to achieve
a desired outcome in an individual case.225 As a practical matter,
moreover, appointments are at best an indirect way to influence the
outcome in particular cases.226 While removal may be a more direct
means to control outcomes in particular cases, such actions would
face other statutory and constitutional constraints. Thus, we believe
the greater concern is that political appointments and expanded removal powers will contribute to systemic biases that compromise the
impartiality of agency adjudication on a macro level.
Systemic bias has been a major problem for agencies that use adjudicators who lack the degree of independence that ALJs enjoyed before the onset of the threats described in this Article.227 For example,
Professors Kim and Semet concluded, based on logistical regression
analysis results, that President Trump has been able to influence removal decisions by Immigration Judges, undermining the assumption
of independence among administrative adjudicators.228 These efforts
224. The Justice Department’s intervention in criminal proceedings against former
Trump administration officials such as Michael Flynn has sparked considerable controversy. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Flynn’s New Argument Is Constitutional Nonsense, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/flynns
-new-argument-constitutional-nonsense/611770 [https://perma.cc/H66S-96HK]; C.
Ryan Barber, Thousands of Ex-Prosecutors Urge Flynn Judge to Question Barr’s Move to
Drop Case, LAW.COM (May 11, 2020), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/
2020/05/11/thousands-of-ex-prosecutors-urge-flynn-judge-to-question-barrs-move
-to-drop-case [https://perma.cc/KST6-68QR].
225. Even the Solicitor General acknowledged this limitation on the removal
power. See Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5 (“An ALJ cannot, however, be removed for any invidious reason or to influence the outcome in a particular adjudication.”).
226. This is especially true so long as adjudications are assigned randomly to ALJs,
as required by 5 U.S.C. § 3105.
227. For discussion of the need for impartial decision-making by administrative
judges, see Barnett, Against AJs, supra note 57, at 1671–85.
228. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political Control over
Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. L.J. 579, 625–30 (2020); see also id. at 583 (“The
Trump Administration has taken a particularly aggressive approach to reshaping immigration courts, which the President has publicly and repeatedly denigrated.”).
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appear to have taken a toll on the morale of Immigration Judges and
other administrative personnel making decisions on the immigration
status of individuals.229 The Trump Administration’s alleged efforts to
interfere with the decisional independence of agency adjudicators
may extend to other agencies such as the Board of Veterans’ Appeals,
as well.230
Competitive civil service appointment, good-cause removal provisions, and other APA safeguards, such as restrictions on performance evaluations for ALJs, protect against this sort of systemic
bias.231 Of course, such protections also make it more difficult for
agencies to engage in legitimate oversight of ALJs so as to ensure ALJs
decide cases accurately, consistently, and expeditiously in accordance
with agency law and policy. Nonetheless, when oversight efforts cross
the line from legitimate supervision to improper influence, ALJ independence is an essential safeguard for impartial decisions.
2. ALJ Oversight in the Social Security Administration
In this respect, the history of the SSA, which employs the lion’s
share of federal ALJs, is instructive. During the Reagan Administration,
the SSA adopted various policies and practices designed to decrease
the rate of ALJ disability allowances.232 Many of these policies and
Although Immigration Judges are not ALJs governed by the APA’s provisions concerning formal adjudication, they “are understood to exercise ‘independent judgment’ in
deciding cases.” Id. at 582 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2020)).
229. See Priscilla Alvarez, Immigration Judges Quit in Response to Administration
Policies, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/27/politics/
immigration-judges-resign/index.html [https://perma.cc/NDL4-5423] (describing an
exodus of immigration judges from their positions that reflected “frustration over a
mounting number of policy changes that, they argue, chipped away at their authority”);
see also Charles Tjersland, Jr., I Became an Asylum Officer to Help People. Now I Put Them
Back in Harm’s Way., WASH. POST (July 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/i-became-an-asylum-officer-to-help-people-now-i-put-them-back-in-harms
-way/2019/07/19/1c9f98f0-a962-11e9-9214-246e594de5d5_story.html [https://
perma.cc/3JQJ-KKU8] (reporting that asylum officers in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services “have reported feeling pressured by supervisors to say it is safe for
migrants to return to Mexico,” knowing “that [the migrants] might be kidnapped, assaulted or killed” upon their return).
230. See Kim & Semet, supra note 228, at 586; see also Jennifer Yachnin, Appointments Signal Political Shift for In-House Judges, E&E NEWS (May 1, 2020), https://
www.eenews.net/stories/1063022081 [https://perma.cc/GR8D-G7DU] (describing a
“seismic shift” in the manner in which the administrative judges on the Interior Board
of Land Appeals are appointed, characterized by a focus on the political ideology of
appointees).
231. See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text (discussing civil service protections for ALJs).
232. See generally Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:
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practices appeared to cross the line from legitimate oversight and policy direction into improper influence that could compromise the impartiality of ALJs.233 Thus, although the SSA had its defenders,234 many
of its policies and practices were invalidated by the courts, reversed
by statute, or withdrawn by the SSA in the face of widespread criticism.235
Dixon v. Shalala provides a useful example.236 Under SSA regulations, which establish a five-step evaluation process for disposition of
Recommendations for Reform, 1990 BYU L. REV. 461, 484–507 (discussing policies and
practices).
233. In testimony before a congressional subcommittee, for example, the President
of the Association of Administrative Law Judges reported that seventy percent of ALJs
responding to an independent survey reported that there was agency pressure to deny
benefits. Social Security Disability Reviews: The Role of the Administrative Law Judge:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs., 98th Cong. 73 (1983) (statement of Charles N. Bono) [hereinafter Disability Reviews]. In other testimony at the same hearing, an ALJ reported that orientation
sessions reflected the view that “most claims deserve to be denied” and that lecturers
“argued with [ALJs] on mock cases, attempting to convince us that they should not be
granted”. Id. at 295 (statement of Joyce Krutick Barlow); see also AALJ Letter, supra
note 159, at 6 (contending that SSA ALJs “are placed in an untenable position, because
they have taken an oath to perform their non-delegable adjudicatory duty grounded in
both the Constitution and statute” but “are being subjected to increased intimidation
and discipline to ensure enforcement of non-binding Agency ‘policy’ and ‘guidance’ for
the purpose of ‘sending a message’ to other judges”).
234. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 500–01
(1990) (arguing that judicial decisions invalidating SSA practices improperly interfered with political control of agency policy). Even if ALJs tend to grant benefits too
easily or are too prone to deny benefits to claimants who qualify, agency efforts to influence ALJ decision-making through the kind of nonbinding policies and guidance we
describe in this section represent precisely the kinds of threats to ALJ impartiality and
independence that support the adoption of the central panel model we discuss in Part
III below.
235. See Levy, supra note 232 (discussing policies and practices and responses to
them).
236. 54 F.3d 1019, 1020–21 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing systematic misapplication
of “severity regulation” to improperly deny benefits in thousands of cases). Another
example was the SSA’s policy of denying benefits to claimants with mental impairments by conclusively presuming that they had the capacity to perform unskilled labor
if their impairments were not severe enough to be per se disabling. See City of New
York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that the SSA had followed an illegal and clandestine policy that conclusively presumed mentally disabled
claimants retained the capacity to perform unskilled work if their impairments were
not sufficiently severe to be per se disabling), aff’d, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’d
sub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986); Mental Health Ass’n of Minn.
v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157, 168 (D. Minn. 1982) (enjoining policy concerning mentally impaired claimants’ eligibility for disability benefits), aff’d in part and modified in
part sub nom. Mental Health Ass’n of Minn. v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983).
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disability claims, benefits are denied at step two if the claimant’s impairments are not “severe.”237 This step is intended to operate as a relatively low threshold requirement and can only be used to deny benefits to “those claimants with slight abnormalities that do not
significantly limit any ‘basic work activity’ . . . .”238 Nonetheless, the
Dixon court upheld a trial court’s finding that the SSA had systematically misapplied the policy to improperly deny benefits, using a variety of informal policies and practices to increase the rate of denials at
this step of the evaluation process from 8% to 40%.239
Similar issues arose in relation to many other aspects of disability
adjudications as the SSA, through a combination of nonlegislative
rules, personnel manuals, and internal memoranda, directed ALJs, for
example, to refuse to consider the combined effects of multiple impairments, disregard claimants’ subjective complaints of pain, and
discount the opinions of claimants’ treating physicians.240 Although
many of these policies were invalidated by courts, the SSA followed a
policy of “non-acquiescence” whereby it would instruct agency personnel to disregard judicial decisions invalidating agency policies—
even in the circuit in which the judicial decisions were rendered.241
Under these circumstances, ALJ independence is critical as a check
against improper agency policies.242
237. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (2019); id. § 416.920(c). Both regulations provide: “If
you do not have any impairment . . . which significantly limits your physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and
work experience.”
238. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a)). Although Yuckert upheld the regulation as facially valid, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion emphasized that the regulation could not be applied to deny benefits improperly. Her opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, was necessary to the result and Dixon, therefore, treated it as controlling. See 54 F.3d at 1030
(“We find that the record evidence supports the district court’s finding that Step Two
was employed pervasively during this period to do exactly what the Yuckert Court forbade—‘to deny benefits to a claimant who may fit within the statutory definition without determining whether the impairment prevents the claimant from engaging in either his prior work or substantial gainful employment that, in light of the claimant’s
age, education, and experience, is available to him in the national economy.’” (quoting
Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 158 (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
239. Dixon, 54 F.3d at 1029–31 (recounting the use of policy guidance, instructional manuals, and less formal controls to produce systematic misapplication of the
severity regulations).
240. See GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 36, at 678–79 (listing ten controversial
agency policies).
241. See Levy, supra note 232, at 503–07 (discussing non-acquiescence policy).
242. We do not think it would violate Article II’s “take care” clause if an ALJ qualifying as an officer of the United States could not be removed from his or her position
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It is hardly surprising, then, that the SSA sought to pressure ALJs
to deny benefits in accordance with its policies, notwithstanding the
questionable legality of those policies. The most prominent example
of agency efforts to pressure ALJs is the so-called Bellmon Review Program,243 through which the SSA “targeted” ALJs with high allowance
rates for performance review on the theory that high allowance rates
correlated with high error rates.244 In Association of Administrative
Law Judges v. Heckler (AALS), a district court concluded that the SSA’s
“unremitting focus on allowance rates . . . created an untenable atmosphere of tension and unfairness which violated the spirit of the APA, if
no specific provision thereof.”245 The SSA also used other methods to
influence ALJs, including increased efforts to remove them, restrictions on travel privileges, denial of staff, and letters advising ALJs

based on a refusal to follow nonbinding agency policies the ALJ regarded as inconsistent with an applicable statute or legislative regulation, particularly if a circuit court
decision from that circuit supported the ALJ’s approach. In Kendall v. United States, the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the “take care” clause vested in the President exclusive authority to control the exercise of the Postmaster General’s discretion.
37 U.S. 524, 612–13 (1838). Doing so would “cloth[e] the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of [C]ongress and paralyze the administration of justice.” Id.
243. The “Bellmon Amendment,” enacted as part of the Social Security Disability
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94 Stat. 441, 456 (1980), directed
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to “implement a
program of reviewing, on his own motion, decisions rendered by administrative law
judges” and to report to Congress on the results of this review program. This report,
known as the Bellmon Report, is reprinted in its entirety in the Social Security Bulletin.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. & SOC. SEC. ADMIN., THE BELLMON REPORT, reprinted in
45 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 3–27 (1982).
244. See Levy, supra note 232, at 498–99 & n.200 (discussing implementation of
program and resulting controversy).
245. 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 (D.D.C. 1984). The district court also observed that
“the injudicious use of phrases such as ‘targeting,’ ‘goals’ and ‘behavior modification’
could have tended to corrupt the ability of administrative law judges to exercise that
independence in the vital cases that they decide.” Id. The district court declined to issue
injunctive relief only because the SSA had already abandoned the objectionable aspects of its review program. Id.; see also W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir.)
(concluding that the targeted review program was a substantive rule that had been
adopted in violation of the notice and comment procedures of the APA, relying in part
on a district court finding that the program was intended to and did alter ALJ decisions), modified on denial of reh’g en banc, 819 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1987). But cf. NLRB v.
Ohio New & Rebuilt Parts, Inc., 760 F.2d 1443, 1451–52 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the NLRB’s system of performance evaluations for regional directors did not sufficiently compromise their impartiality so as to violate due process).
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that they must increase productivity or decrease their allowance
rates.246
Ultimately, these two cases and other appellate court decisions
suggest that the validity of the SSA’s oversight efforts appears to depend on the extent to which they tend to pressure ALJs to decide cases
in a particular way. Thus, for example, in Nash v. Bowen, the court concluded that the SSA’s peer review program, establishment of production goals, and use of ALJ reversal rates to select decisions for quality
assurance review did not interfere with the decisional independence
of ALJs.247 Similarly, in Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Colvin, a recent Seventh Circuit case, the court upheld the SSA’s adoption
of a quota requiring ALJs to issue at least 500 disability claim decisions
a year.248 The court rejected the ALJ union’s argument that the quota
pressured ALJs to award benefits because it is easier to prepare a justification for granting than for denying benefits.249 The court concluded that the APA’s protection of ALJ independence did not prohibit
the adoption of a bona fide production quota, notwithstanding its “incidental consequences.”250
The history of pressure on ALJs within the SSA highlights the
threat to ALJ independence presented by the Solicitor General’s position that agency heads must be able to remove ALJs who do not “follow
agency policies, procedures, or instructions.”251 Agency policies, procedures, and instructions come in various forms, often with little or no
public input, and may be of dubious legality.252 Some agency policies,
such as the SSA’s “Social Security Rulings,” are relatively formal
246. See Disability Reviews, supra note 233, at 72–73; id. at 265–68 (Chart, Actions
Against Administrative Law Judges 1946–83).
247. 869 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989). The court also expressed doubt that the APA
creates a general right of ALJ independence, aside from its specific provisions concerning tenure, compensation, and exemption from performance evaluations. Id.
248. 777 F.3d 402, 405–06 (7th Cir. 2015).
249. Id. at 404. According to the union, an ALJ need not be as careful in analyzing a
disability claim in granting benefits because the SSA cannot appeal an award, so that
the ALJ “doesn’t . . . have to try to make his decision appeal proof.” Id.
250. Id. at 405–06.
251. Guidance Memorandum, supra note 5.
252. President Trump has subjected some agency guidance documents to noticeand-comment procedures normally reserved for legislative rules. Exec. Order No.
13,891, Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,
84 Fed. Reg. 55,235, 55,237 (Oct. 15, 2019); see also Memorandum from Dominic J.
Mancini, Acting Adm’r, Off. of Info. & Regul. Affs., to Regul. Pol’y Officers at Exec. Dep’ts
& Agencies & Managing & Exec. Dirs. of Certain Agencies and Comm’ns (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/M-20-02-Guidance
-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTE7-XZHG].
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“nonlegislative rules” that are published in the Federal Register and
broadly available to the public. Others, however, are less formal and
less transparent, including agency personnel manuals, internal memoranda and instructions, and even oral communications.
When agencies use nonlegislative rules to make policy, they may
do so without following notice-and-comment procedures,253 but such
policies are not supposed to be binding on the general public.254 Nonetheless, agencies typically treat them as binding on agency personnel,
including ALJs. The SSA, for example, has stated that although Social
Security Rulings do not have the force and effect of the law or regulations, “[t]hey are binding on all components of the Social Security Administration.”255 More specifically, the SSA has stated that “[w]e require adjudicators at all levels of administrative review to follow
agency policy, as set out in the Commissioner’s regulations, SSRs, Social Security Acquiescence Rulings (ARs), and other instructions, such
as the Program Operations Manual System (POMS), Emergency Messages, and the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX).”256 It has taken this position despite judicial rulings that the
agency’s nonlegislative rules, such as HALLEX, do not create binding
obligations.257 Although it may be proper for agencies to rely on nonlegislative rules for support in an adjudication,258 if those rules are
253. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
254. See, e.g., Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2012)
(stating that SSA Acquiescence Rulings “lack the force of law” and are “a type of ruling
that is non-binding except within the agency”); Farrell v. Dep’t of the Interior, 314 F.3d
584, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (concerning policy statements).
255. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1) (2018); see also Preface to Social Security and Acquiescence Rulings, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/rulings-pref
.html [https://perma.cc/B4PZ-NJ56] (stating that the agency’s “Acquiescence Rulings
do not have the force and effect of the law or regulations, however, they are binding on
all components of SSA”). According to representatives of the Association of Administrative Law Judges, International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees,
Judicial Council 1, AFL-CIO, “ALJs are not a component [of SSA]. ALJs are appointees
under Section 3105 of the APA. We conduct non-adversarial, inquisitorial hearings under Section 556 of the APA.” AALJ Letter, supra note 159, at 5.
256. Social Security Ruling 13-2p; Titles II and XVI: Evaluating Cases Involving
Drug Addiction and Alcoholism (DAA), 78 Fed. Reg. 11,939, 11,946 (Feb. 20, 2013).
257. See, e.g., Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003) (HALLEX and
POMS); cf. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (“As HALLEX does not
have the force and effect of law, it is not binding on the Commissioner and we will not
review allegations of noncompliance with the manual.” (citing W. Radio Servs. Co. v.
Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1996))).
258. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 87–88 (1995) (upholding HHS’s reliance on an interpretive rule to resolve the hospital’s Medicare reimbursement claim because the rule was not inconsistent with agency legislative rules and,
therefore, did not effect a substantive change in the law). In such cases, however, the
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binding on ALJs, they are for all practical purposes binding on the general public as well, especially if backed with the threat of disciplinary
action for ALJs who do not follow them.259
The threat of disciplinary action against ALJs who do not follow
agency policies and instructions is all the more problematic when
those policies and instructions are less formal, such as those found in
personnel manuals, memoranda to agency personnel, and oral communications. As reflected in the foregoing discussion, the SSA’s past
use of such informal policies and instructions often lacked transparency, making it difficult to identify their influence on ALJ decisions. In
addition, when the failure of ALJs to follow informal policies and instructions that violate statutes and agency regulations subjects them
to disciplinary action, including removal from office, ALJs are in an untenable position that compromises their ability to conduct impartial
adjudications.260
III. THE CENTRAL PANEL MODEL AS A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO
THREATS TO ALJ INDEPENDENCE
In view of these threats to ALJ independence, some legislative response is needed to restore ALJ independence and preserve impartial
agency adjudication.261 Any such reforms would have to be consistent
ruling is not necessarily binding, and reliance may be constrained. See, e.g., Allen v.
Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 407–08 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating, in dictum, that if the SSA
wishes to rely on a Social Security Ruling to deny disability benefits, “advance notice
should be given,” and that the court will apply “close scrutiny” to an ALJ’s reliance on
a Ruling in the absence of notice of its relevance in advance of the ALJ hearing).
259. See Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 442 (5th Cir. 2019) (“That the agency’s action binds its staff or creates safe harbors demonstrates that legal consequences flow
from it, even when the agency lacks authority to promulgate substantive regulations
implementing the statute it administers.”); Robertson v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-1419-DGKSSA, 2014 WL 106117, at *7 n.5 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2014) (“Although the POMS is not
binding on ALJs, it is a persuasive authority for courts to use in analyzing an ALJ’s findings.” (citing Hartfield v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2004))); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Should the Public Get to Participate Before Federal Agencies Issue Guidance? An
Empirical Study, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 57, 61 (2019) (describing complaints that agencies
follow guidance “as they would a binding legislative rule, and regulated parties are under coercive pressure to do the same,” but that public participation opportunities are
more limited than for legislative rules).
260. See, e.g., Salling v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046, 1067 (W.D. Va. 1986) (concluding that “unadvertised internal decision[s]” that “radically changed” agency policies
“by internal rules that do not have the force and effect of regulations” were “simply
nothing more nor less than an attempt by the bureaucracy to control the independence
of the ALJs”).
261. Cf. AALJ Letter, supra note 159, at 5 (“With less and less congressional oversight, it is highly likely that . . . the use of guidance and non-legislative rules has derailed
Social Security’s mission . . . .”).
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with the constitutional demands of separation of powers, including
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Free Enterprise Fund, Lucia, and Seila
Law. In this part of the Article, we suggest that a variation of the “central panel” used in many states might be a workable approach to securing ALJ independence without violating constitutional norms.262
A. A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
As Part II makes clear, some sort of congressional response is
necessary to address constitutional issues and reinforce ALJ independence.263 Indeed, notwithstanding our hyper-partisan times, we
hope that this will be regarded as a nonpartisan issue.264 Both progressives and conservatives should be concerned that overzealous political appointees will try to exert improper influence over adjudications within their purview. Accordingly, even as the Trump
Administration has taken steps to remove or undermine safeguards
for ALJ independence, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
has issued a “request for information” on “[i]mproving and/or reforming regulatory enforcement and adjudication.”265 Among the topics on
262. See generally Malcolm C. Rich & Alison C. Goldstein, The Need for a Central
Panel Approach to Administrative Adjudication: Pros, Cons, and Selected Practices, 39 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 5 (2019) (providing a comprehensive review of central panels in the states and suggesting best practices, intended in part “to inform the
debate over whether the central panel approach is something that the federal government should consider”); REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT prefatory note at 6
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (explaining that “[t]he growth of central panel agencies in the
states since the adoption of the 1981 Act has been significant with 25 states currently
having these agencies”); JOINT STATE GOV’T COMM’N, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA., REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA 34–36 (2014) (listing 27 states with central panels).
263. See also Nou, supra note 10, at 1199 (“In the final analysis, the ideal monitor
for protecting ALJ decisional independence may ultimately be Congress itself.”).
264. See, e.g., Jessie Bur, Bipartisan Bill Would Counter Administrative Law Judge
Executive Order, FED. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.federaltimes.com/federal
-oversight/congress/2018/09/04/bipartisan-bill-would-counter-administrative-law
-judge-executive-order [https://perma.cc/B7C9-MNE9] (quoting statement by Senator Susan Collins that bill she co-sponsored with Senator Maria Cantwell was “bipartisan legislation [that] would ensure that administrative law judges remain well qualified and impartial, while this crucial process remains nonpartisan and fair”). Of course,
the two political parties might be more or less concerned about political influence depending on the context and who controls political appointments. See infra note 267.
Impartial adjudication is the long-term and stable solution to these concerns, and it is
in the long-term interests of both political parties. At the same time, we do not wish to
overstate the prospect of the two parties looking past their mutual antagonism and
zero-sum thinking to cooperate on this sort of measure.
265. Improving and Reforming Regulatory Enforcement and Adjudication, 85 Fed.
Reg. 5,483 (Jan. 30, 2020).
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which OMB requested information is whether “adjudicators sometimes lack independence from the enforcement arm of the agency.”266
Assuming that some legislative response is in order, what sort of response would be the most desirable?
One approach would be to shore up the particular safeguards for
ALJ appointment and removal that have been eroded by judicial decisions and executive actions. Restoring competitive civil service appointments, for example, would be a fairly straightforward proposition.267 Likewise, it might be possible to amend § 7521(a) so as to
strengthen the good-cause removal requirement and preclude the Solicitor General’s interpretation.268 Such a statutory fix, however, might
actually bolster the argument that the President has inadequate control over ALJs and cause the Solicitor General to decline to defend the
provision.269 Equally important, it would not solve the problem of dual
good-cause removal requirements.
266. Id. at 5,484. The apparent concern here is that agency adjudicators lack the
independence to resist an agency’s overzealous regulatory enforcement—a “conservative” concern. In contrast, concerns over agency pressure to wrongfully deny Social
Security disability benefits is a more “progressive” concern.
267. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (describing introduction of
bill to restore civil service appointments for ALJs). Restoring the rule of three depends,
of course, on the constitutionality of constraining appointments by heads of departments from a short list of candidates selected using a competitive merit selection process, an issue that Lucia did not address. The Department of Justice might argue that
such constraints interfere with the President or agency head’s political discretion to
appoint executive officers. See, e.g., David Ames, Cassandra Handan-Nader, Daniel E.
Ho & David Marcus, Due Process and Mass Adjudication: Crisis and Reform, 72 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 13 (2020) (arguing that Lucia “cast doubt on . . . [the] constitutionality” of the
“nonpolitical [appointment] process administered by [OPM]”); Drew Thornley & Justin
Blount, SEC In-House Tribunals: A Call for Reform, 62 VILL. L. REV. 261, 289 (2017) (describing pre-Lucia contentions that the SEC’s process of appointing ALJs through selection by the SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges from an OPM-recommended
list of candidates was unconstitutional). The legality of the rule of three may also depend on the characterization of ALJs as principal or inferior officers. Even assuming
constitutional concerns regarding application of the rule of three to ALJ appointments
are valid, however, they simply reinforce our conviction that a more systemic solution
such as the central panel model we recommend is essential for the protection of ALJ
independence. In devising an apolitical appointment process for the ALJs on the central
panel, it may be appropriate to design the process to avoid this issue. One option would
be to provide for ALJ appointment by the courts, which would be constitutionally valid
if ALJs are inferior officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. For further discussion of this issue,
see infra notes 282–87 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 212–21 (discussing the Solicitor General’s Guidance Memorandum that interpreted the statute as allowing removal for failure to follow policies,
procedures, and instructions and as requiring the MSPB to defer to the agency head).
269. Nonetheless, we think it would be preferable to shore up the statutory language of good-cause removal protections, as opposed to allowing the Court to rely on
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There is no obvious legislative fix for the dual good-cause issue.270 Removing good-cause protections for ALJs would solve the
constitutional problem but would further undermine ALJ independence rather than bolster it. Removing good-cause protections for the
principal officers who oversee ALJs would also solve the dual goodcause problem but only by fundamentally altering the character of
many agencies that use ALJs. For traditional independent agencies like
the FTC, NLRB, or SEC, eliminating agency independence seems like
the tail wagging the dog—even if independent agencies are unconstitutional or a bad idea, that issue should be decided on its own merits,
not as a remedy for a different constitutional problem.271 The vast majority of ALJs work in the SSA, which did not become an independent
agency until the 1990s.272 Thus, eliminating the Social Security Commissioner’s good-cause removal protections might be more acceptable, especially since their constitutionality is in doubt after Seila
Law.273 But removal of those protections might politicize the agency
in ways that would tend to increase improper pressures on ALJs and
compromise the SSA’s independence on other matters, such as managing the Social Security Trust Fund.274
The MSPB adds an additional wrinkle, as some judges and litigants seem to treat it as the relevant principal officer under Free
the constitutional avoidance canon to weaken those protections. We support this allor-nothing approach because we consider an explicit repudiation of good cause to be
more transparent than the sham of retaining good-cause removal provisions that do
not provide adequate safeguards against improper removal. If the impartiality of ALJs
cannot be protected, it is better for legislators and the public to know so that they can
pursue alternative adjudicatory models (such as the creation of an Article I court).
270. See supra notes 168–76 and accompanying text (discussing proper remedies
if dual good-cause removal requirements for ALJs violate Free Enterprise Fund); Jellum,
supra note 157, at 745 (“Assuming that the Supreme Court is likely to hold 5 U.S.C.
§ 7521 unconstitutional, and that protecting ALJ independence within constitutional
constraints is a worthy endeavor, then the question is, how might the Court resolve
this mess? There is no perfect resolution . . . .”).
271. As noted above, proponents of a strong, unitary executive might regard the
elimination of independent agencies as a good thing that is, in fact, constitutionally required. See supra note 174.
272. Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-296, § 101, 108 Stat. 1464, 1465 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 901(a)).
273. See supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text (discussing implications of
Seila Law for the constitutional validity of good-cause protections for the Commissioner of the SSA).
274. Of course, like all agencies, the SSA is already politicized to a significant degree. See supra note 233 (discussing agency pressure on ALJs in the SSA). The question
is whether eliminating the Commissioner’s independence would tend to increase the
degree of politicization.
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Enterprise Fund.275 Congress could try to avoid eliminating the goodcause removal protections for independent agencies by eliminating
them for the MSPB, but that solution is problematic as well. In the first
place, it may not be sufficient if, as we suspect, the agency head is the
relevant principal.276 Even if the dual good-cause removal problem
could be solved by removing good-cause protections for the MSPB
(without eliminating good-cause removal for the independent agencies employing ALJs),277 the MSPB is intended to be an independent
adjudicatory body,278 and politicizing it would create its own problems both for civil service in general and ALJs in particular. Indeed,
good-cause removal provisions for ALJs are not meaningful in the absence of some independent determination of whether good cause exists.
Ultimately, shoring up particular safeguards for appointment
and removal provisions is a more complex and less effective response
than it might appear at first glance. More fundamentally, deeper questions about agency efforts to control ALJs through problematic means
will persist. The relevant concerns include the use of nonlegislative
rules that purport to be binding only internally but that effectively
bind the public. They also include the use of even less formal means to
exert pressure to produce outcomes that are consistent with the legally questionable preferences of agencies’ political leaders. Accordingly, more comprehensive reforms may be in order.
One possibility would be to create an administrative court, as
Professor Rappaport has advocated.279 This solution has some appeal,
275. In Fleming v. United States Department of Agriculture, No. 17-1246 (D.C. Cir.
filed Nov. 16, 2017), the petitioners have challenged good-cause removal provisions
for ALJs in the Department of Agriculture on the theory that the good-cause removal
requirements for the MSPB create a second layer of good-cause removal requirements
in violation of Free Enterprise Fund. See Corrected Brief of Petitioners Joe Fleming, Sam
Perkins and Jarrett Bradley at 55–59, Fleming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 17-1246 (D.C.
Cir. May 21, 2019).
276. Professor Jellum has suggested that it may be necessary to eliminate goodcause protections for both the employing agency head and the MSPB. See Jellum, supra
note 157, at 743–44 (arguing that even ALJs in executive agencies whose head is removable at will by the President violate Free Enterprise Fund’s prohibition on dual
good-cause removal because the MSPB’s members are only removable for good cause).
277. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (explaining that eliminating goodcause protections for the MSPB was suggested by a concurring judge in Bandimere v.
SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1191 (10th Cir. 2016) (Briscoe, J., concurring)).
278. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
279. See Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Agency Adjudication with Independent
Administrative Courts, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 811, 812 (2019) (arguing that “the use of
genuinely independent courts that have expertise and that use the streamlined procedures of administrative adjudications . . . would serve to promote the limited and
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insofar as it would separate the adjudication of cases from agency enforcement and policymaking, but it also presents a number of practical
problems. These problems would arise whether such an administrative court is constituted as an Article III or an Article I court. For several reasons, we think that an Article III court is a political “nonstarter.” An Article I court would be more politically feasible but ultimately suffers from most of the same problems.
The creation of an Article III administrative court would mean
that administrative judges are subject to the same constitutional provisions and protections as other Article III judges. They would be appointed by the President with Senate consent,280 and they would enjoy
life tenure and salary protections.281 More broadly, the structural independence of the federal judiciary would limit an agency’s ability to
influence adjudication through its oversight of adjudicatory personnel.282 These constitutional requirements, however, make an Article
III court an unsuitable entity for the adjudication of administrative
matters.283 Recent experience with the appointment process in various contexts has amply demonstrated that presidential appointment
with Senate consent is unlikely to depoliticize the appointment of administrative judges.284 In addition, administrative adjudication is
effective government of the separation of powers while also furthering the expert and
expeditious decision-making of agency adjudication”). Many other countries have administrative courts, including Germany and France. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
“History Belongs to the Winners”: The Bazelon-Leventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1009 (2006) (“In France and Germany, specialized courts are charged
with overseeing the rationality of agency work product.” (citations omitted)).
280. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (specifying that the President “shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for”). Although the Appointments Clause does not explicitly
require this means of appointment for lower court judges, we are not aware of anyone
who has suggested that lower federal court judges with Article III status can be treated
as inferior officers.
281. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
282. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–25 (1995) (describing
the historical background and separation of powers principles underlying the creation
of a separate judicial branch of government under the Constitution).
283. These concerns would not apply, however, to the creation of a specialized Article III court that engages in judicial review of some or all final agency actions, including agency adjudications. We take no position on the desirability of such a court.
284. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text (analyzing recent Supreme
Court decisions and executive actions affecting ALJs). See generally Shany Winder,
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much more streamlined than a judicial trial,285 and so this option
would likely be too resource-intensive.
More fundamentally, under the current system of administrative
adjudication, ALJs make the initial decision, subject to a de novo determination by the agency head or an internal appellate body.286 This
arrangement uses ALJs to process high-volume administrative adjudications, while the agencies have the final say on policy matters, including the ability to make policy through precedential adjudication.287 If
Article III courts conduct the initial adjudication, however, it would be
unconstitutional to give the agency any review power because the final decisions of Article III courts cannot be reviewed or reopened by
the executive or legislative branches.288 Thus, the creation of an Article III court to adjudicate matters currently resolved by ALJs would
necessarily eliminate the agencies’ ability to review administrative
adjudications or make policy through precedential decisions.
The creation of an Article I court might address some of these issues. Some Article I courts, like the Tax Court, utilize presidential appointment with Senate consent and provide for removal by the President for good cause after a public hearing.289 This model, which treats
Article I judges as principal officers, would likely avoid any constitutional issues with either appointment or removal,290 but it might not
Extraordinary Policymaking Powers of the Executive Branch: A New Approach, 37 VA.
ENV’T L.J. 207, 232 (2019) (“Politicization is achieved through presidential political appointments in agencies to ensure the loyalty of personnel and the agencies’ commitment to the president’s preferred policy agenda.”); Madeline June Kass, Presidentially
Appointed Environmental Agency Saboteurs, 87 UMKC L. REV. 697, 706 (2019) (charging that “extreme politicization of the EPA poses dangers both to environmental protection and representative democracy absent viable checks on the presidential appointment powers”).
285. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 131.
286. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision . . . .”).
287. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing how precedential adjudications may be used to make policy).
288. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (stating that Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792), “stands for the principle that Congress cannot
vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch”).
289. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(b) (“Judges of the Tax Court shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, solely on the grounds of
fitness to perform the duties of the office.”); id. § 7443(f) (“Judges of the Tax Court may
be removed by the President, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.”).
290. Seila Law deals with officials in agencies within the executive branch, not Article I courts located (at least nominally) in the judicial branch. 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191
(2020). To the extent that Article I judges are considered to be part of the judicial
branch, the vesting of executive power in the President would not imply any authority
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provide sufficient protection against the politicization of agency adjudication. Bankruptcy judges, on the other hand, are treated as inferior
officers; they are appointed by the courts of appeal and subject to removal only for good cause by the judicial council of the circuit in which
they are located.291 This model might reduce the politicization of administrative appointment and removals,292 but its constitutionality is
less clear.
To the extent that Article I courts are considered to be part of the
judicial branch, moreover, it is unclear that using an Article I administrative court would solve the problem of review by the administrative
agency. Such an arrangement still would likely be unconstitutional because the validity of Article I courts rests largely on the retained supervisory authority of the Article III courts.293 Although most agency
adjudications might be regarded as addressing public rights that may
be determined by agencies or Article I courts,294 it is unlikely that Congress could vest an agency with de novo decisional authority over the
decisions of an Article I court.295 We are not aware of any Article I
court that follows such a model.296

to remove them. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text (discussing Seila
Law’s articulation of a strong presidential removal power derived from the Vesting
Clause of Article II).
291. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (“Each bankruptcy judge . . . shall be appointed
by the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which [the judge’s] district
is located.”); id. § 152(e) (“A bankruptcy judge may be removed during the term for
which such bankruptcy judge is appointed, only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect
of duty, or physical or mental disability and only by the judicial council of the circuit in
which the judge’s official duty station is located. Removal may not occur unless a majority of all of the judges of such council concur in the order of removal.”).
292. In addition, appointments might be constrained through some sort of merit
requirements. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (directing appointments of bankruptcy judges
to be made “after considering the recommendations of the Judicial Conference”).
293. Cf. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015) (“But
allowing Article I adjudicators to decide claims submitted to them by consent does not
offend the separation of powers so long as Article III courts retain supervisory authority
over the process.” (emphasis added)).
294. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the public rights doctrine).
295. Hayburn’s Case, for example, held that Congress could not assign the determination of military pensions—a quintessential public right—to the federal courts subject to review by the Secretary of War. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 (1792).
296. Appeals from the Tax Court, the Bankruptcy Court, the Court of Federal
Claims, and the Court of Appeals for Veteran’s Claims, for example, all go directly to
Article III courts without any agency review. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) (Tax Court); 28
U.S.C. § 158 (Bankruptcy Court); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (Court of Federal Claims); 38
U.S.C. § 7292 (Court of Appeals for Veteran’s Claims).
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Given the problems with specific statutory fixes or the use of an
administrative court to address current threats to independent
agency adjudication, we think another option warrants consideration:
the central panel model. A properly structured central panel of independent federal ALJs could protect impartial agency adjudication,
avoid constitutional problems, and allow agencies an appropriate degree of policy control.
B. THE CENTRAL PANEL MODEL
The essential feature of the central panel model is that agency adjudicators are not part of the agency for which they adjudicate
cases.297 The Uniform Law Commission recommended this approach
in the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act (Revised
Model Act) adopted in 2010.298 The prefatory note to the Revised
Model Act explains that this model “provides for a neutral separation
of the hearing and decision authority from the agency authority to enforce the law and adopt agency rules” and that “[c]entral panel agencies have independence from other executive branch agencies which
can provide for greater fairness in contested case hearings.”299 In particular, “[a]dministrative law judges that work for the Office of Administrative Hearings would not be subject to command influence from
the agency head whose contested cases the administrative law judge
is presiding over.”300
Under the central panel model in the Revised Model Act, adjudicators work for a separate office of administrative hearings headed by
a chief administrative law judge.301 The chief administrative law judge
is appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the

297. See Rich & Goldstein, supra note 20, at 2 (“The central panel system is a framework to increase the judicialization of the state administrative process by seeking to
keep ALJs separate from the agencies they serve . . . .”).
298. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT §§ 601–607 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010). In
its adoption of the central panel model, the Revised Model Act is similar to and based
on “the Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency (Office of Administrative
Hearings) adopted by the house of delegates of the American Bar Association (February 2, 1997).” See id. §§ 601–606 cmts. (referencing corresponding sections of the ABA
model act).
299. Id. prefatory note at 6; see also id. § 601 cmt. (“States that adopt Article Six
would provide for a separate hearing agency and would ensure impartiality and fairness in contested cases by separating the adjudication function from the prosecution
and investigative functions.”).
300. Id. § 601 cmt.
301. For comprehensive discussion of the central panel model’s operation in the
states that have adopted the Revised Model Act, see Rich & Goldstein, supra note 20.
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Senate, and can be removed only for good cause.302 The chief administrative law judge is, in turn, responsible for appointing ALJs and exercises administrative supervisory authority, including the power to
discipline them pursuant to the state’s merit system law and to remove them for good cause.303 The Revised Model Act contemplates
that an ALJ may be given final decisional authority, or that the judge
may issue a recommended decision subject to a final determination by
the agency head.304 It further specifies that, “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law . . . if a contested case is referred to the office by an
agency, the agency may not take further action with respect to the proceeding, except as a party, until a recommended, initial, or final order
is issued.”305
The use of the central panel model for federal ALJs is not a new
idea, and proposals to adopt one have surfaced periodically in the
past. The so-called Heflin Bill, introduced in 1983 and again in
1993,306 would have created a central panel of federal ALJs, but that
bill was not adopted. Although some commentators supported the
adoption of a federal central panel,307 others (including leading
302. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 602(a), (e).
303. See id. § 603(a), (d)(3). The chief administrative law judge may also remove
ALJs pursuant to a reduction of force. Id. § 603(d)(4). The transition to an approach in
which the chief ALJ would appoint central panel members should not cause undue administrative burdens. The statute creating the central panel could relocate currently
appointed ALJs to the central panel. The chief judge would fill vacancies, but doing so
would create no greater burdens than OPM currently bears.
304. See id. § 606(a) (“If the administrative law judge is delegated final decisional
authority, the administrative law judge shall issue a final order. If the administrative
law judge is not delegated final decisional authority, the administrative law judge shall
issue to the agency head a recommended order in the contested case.”).
305. Id. § 606(b).
306. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 129 CONG. REC. 12,116–19 (1983); S. 486, 103d Cong., 139
CONG. REC. 4064–67 (1993). For discussion of these bills, see Edwin L. Felter, Jr., The
Hidden Executive Branch Judiciary: Colorado’s Central Panel Experience—Lessons for
the Feds, 14 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 95, 95 (1994); Victor W. Palmer & Edwin S.
Bernstein, Establishing Federal Administrative Law Judges as an Independent Corps: The
Heflin Bill, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 673 (1984); Malcolm C. Rich, The Central Panel System
and the Decisionmaking Independence for Administrative Law Judges: Lessons for a Proposed Federal Program, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 656–57 (1984).
307. See, e.g., Karen Y. Kauper, Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative
Law Judges: A Model Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
537, 538–39 (1985) (arguing for the creation of a federal central panel “to protect both
the independence of the ALJs and the public interest”); Victor W. Palmer, The Evolving
Role of Administrative Law Judges, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 755, 800 (1984) (“[The Heflin
Bill] would rectify the critical problems inherent in the present ALJ/agency relationship . . . . A valid, independent administrative judiciary should emerge which will be
responsive to the actual adjudicative needs and demands of agencies.”); cf. Joseph J.
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administrative law scholars) opposed it.308 In 1992, for example, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) declined to
recommend that the federal government create a central panel “at this
time.”309
Ultimately, the question of whether to adopt a central panel
model involves a balancing of competing considerations. The need for
ALJ independence to ensure impartial adjudication must be balanced
against the need for agency expertise and policy control. Whatever the
appropriate balance may have been at the time of the APA’s adoption,
when the Heflin Bill was under consideration, or when ACUS found it
unnecessary to recommend an independent ALJ corps based on the
central panel model, those decisions were premised on the assumption that ALJ independence was adequately protected through other
means. That assumption is, quite simply, no longer true. Accordingly,
it is appropriate to revisit the idea of adopting the central panel model
for federal ALJs.
C. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF A FEDERAL CENTRAL PANEL
The key advantage of the central panel model is that ALJs would
be housed within a specialized agency for administrative adjudication
rather than in the agencies for which they adjudicate cases.310
Simeone, The Function, Flexibility, and Future of United States Judges of the Executive
Department, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 172–73 (1992) (“A unified corps by which judges
are assigned to particular cases instead of being assigned by the particular department
or agency would have the beneficent effect of removing the incongruous status and the
public perception that such judges have an agency bias in favor of their controlling
authority.”).
308. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Daniel J. Gifford, Charles H. Koch, Jr., Richard J. Pierce,
Jr. & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Report for Recommendations 92-7, The Federal Administrative
Judiciary, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 779 (1992) (suggesting that the central panel model is a poor choice because
of its lack of ALJ specialized expertise and increased cost of adjudication); Norman
Zankel, A Unified Corps of Federal Administrative Law Judges Is Not Needed, 6 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 723 (1984); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 733–34 (2005), reprinted in 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES
49, 107 (2005) (arguing that a central panel model would prevent ALJs from “participating in the evolution of administrative policy,” among other limitations). Professor
Koch published a shorter version of the same basic analysis in Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Judges’ Role in Developing Social Policy, 68 LA. L. REV. 1095 (2008).
309. The Administrative Conference of the United States concluded that “Congress
should not at this time make structural changes . . . such as those in recent legislative
proposals to establish a centralized corps of ALJs.” ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note
58, at 16.
310. See Rich & Goldstein, supra note 20, at 2 (describing the separation of ALJs
and the agencies they serve in the central panel system).
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Nonetheless, there are numerous features of the central panel’s design
that must be considered, including the agency’s location within the
structure of government, the methods of appointment and removal of
ALJs, and the role of the agencies whose cases the ALJs adjudicate. A
properly designed central panel model could protect ALJ independence in a manner that is consistent with the constitutional requirements for appointment and removal of ALJs, while preserving agency
expertise and policy authority and clarifying the appropriate scope
and means of agency policy control over ALJ decisions.
1. Locating the Agency
An initial question would be where to locate a central panel of
ALJs. Two options come immediately to mind: the panel could be located within the Department of Justice or be constituted as a freestanding entity. Although the Department of Justice might seem to be
a natural fit, the creation of a freestanding agency is the superior option because it is less likely to be politicized.311
If the ultimate goal of creating a central panel is to promote ALJ
independence, the institutional structure of the central panel should
reinforce that goal. Locating the panel within the Department of Justice would expose it to the politicization of that department. Although
the Attorney General and the Department of Justice may at times exhibit a strong commitment to the rule of law and assert sufficient independence to do so, in practice, those offices are political in character.312 Given its broad power and importance, Presidents seek to
control the Department of Justice by appointing political allies as Attorney General.313 Placing the central panel within the Department of
Justice would therefore place it under the control of a highly politicized principal officer.314
Although the creation of a freestanding agency is no guarantee
against politicization, the limited policy authority and quasi-judicial
character of the central panel would provide some measure of
311. See supra note 284 (discussing recent agency politicization).
312. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Charlie Savage, Sharon LaFraniere & Ben Protess, After
Stone Case, Prosecutors Say They Fear Pressure from Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/12/us/politics/justice-department-roger-stone
-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/5H9P-FZN9] (discussing concerns that the Department of Justice has become highly politicized).
313. Id.
314. The fact that those officials represent agencies in court when litigants adversely affected by agency decisions challenge them would create further tension between adherence to the rule of law and agency independence if the Attorney General
were vested with supervising a central panel.
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protection against politicization. If the central panel is freestanding,
its head would be a principal officer to be appointed by the President
with Senate consent.315 Although the possibility of highly partisan political appointments cannot be discounted, it would be harder for
Presidents to defend partisan political appointments to lead a quasijudicial agency, and the Senate (and public) are more likely to demand
the appointment of a qualified individual with an appropriate temperament. Conversely, while the Department of Justice’s broad authority
creates a strong incentive for Presidents to appoint loyal political allies to the leadership positions within the Department of Justice, the
relatively narrow mandate and limited policy authority of the central
panel’s head would tend to diminish the incentive to politicize that appointment.
These considerations should not be overstated. In our hyper-partisan times, every appointment is prone to politicization.316 Nonetheless, if the goal is ALJ independence, a freestanding central panel
makes more sense than a central panel located within the Department
of Justice.
2. Appointment and Removal
To avoid constitutional problems, the appointment and removal
provisions for ALJs must comply with the Appointments Clause and
avoid the dual good-cause removal problem. The appointment problem is relatively easy to address, provided that ALJs are inferior officers. The dual good-cause removal problem is more complicated but
can be resolved with the proper institutional structure. In light of Seila
Law, however, the constitutionality of single good-cause removal provisions for ALJs on the central panel may be in doubt.317 These considerations interact with each other and have significant implications for
other features of a central panel’s institutional design.
The appointment of ALJs to the central panel should be meritbased and apolitical to the largest extent possible. In this respect, it
would make sense to restore the competitive civil service selection
process, with the understanding that the final appointment would be

315. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
316. See, e.g., Winder, supra note 284 (“[T]he president’s political and ideological
agendas and the agency head’s interests and efforts are often strongly aligned, and this
alignment moves executive action forward.”).
317. See 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (holding invalid good-cause removal provisions for the Director of the CFPB).
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made by the head of the central panel.318 Alternatively, it would be
possible to provide for appointment by the federal courts,319 following
the model of the Bankruptcy Courts and the appointment of independent counsels before the lapse of Title VI of the Ethics in Government
Act.320 Although we lean toward the civil service model, either approach would be superior to Executive Order 13,843. Either approach
would be constitutionally permissible, provided that ALJs in the new
model are inferior officers.321 That question, in turn, will depend on
other features of the panel’s institutional design that establish a superior officer.
The removal provisions for ALJs must be carefully crafted to ensure strong protection for ALJ independence without violating the
President’s removal power. The good-cause requirements themselves
should be clearly and strongly written to preclude the Solicitor General’s narrowing construction, which is an extreme reading of the
President’s removal power for quasi-judicial officers that is not constitutionally required under current doctrine.322 Strong good-cause
removal requirements, however, may be problematic for two reasons.
First, they increase the likelihood that the Court might hold that such
provisions violate Article II (because the constitutional avoidance
318. See supra notes 51–59 (discussing civil service protections for ALJs); see also
supra note 267 (discussing the restoration of civil service appointments for ALJs).
319. A court could not appoint the chief judge of the panel, however, because the
chief judge would be a principal officer who could only be appointed by the President
under the Appointments Clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The only way to eliminate this
problem would be to place the chief judge under the supervision of a superior, thereby
converting the chief judge to an inferior officer. Id. But subjecting the chief judge to the
supervision of an executive official would undermine the ALJ independence that a central panel is meant to protect.
320. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (providing for inter-branch appointment of independent counsel by a panel of three circuit court of appeals judges, including one from the D.C. Circuit, selected by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court). Independent counsel was
appointed under Title VI “to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain highranking Government officials for violations of federal criminal law.” Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988).
321. In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that appointment of executive branch officials by the courts of law violates separation of powers.
487 U.S. at 673–77 (1988). Nonetheless, it did acknowledge that such appointments
might be invalid in particular circumstances “if there was some ‘incongruity’ between
the functions normally performed by the courts and the performance of their duty to
appoint.” Id. at 676 (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1880)). If, however,
there is no such incongruity in the judicial appointment of a prosecutor (as the Court
held in Morrison), it is doubtful that appointment of ALJs would be incompatible with
the courts’ judicial roles. Id. at 696–97.
322. See supra notes 212–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Solicitor General’s Guidance Memorandum).
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option is not available).323 As noted above, we think a clear holding on
this point is preferable to a weakening of good-cause removal protections through the application of the constitutional avoidance canon.324
Second, even if good-cause removal provisions for ALJs survive a postSeila Law challenge, strong provisions might undermine the characterization of ALJs as inferior officers. That problem, however, should
not be prohibitive if ALJ decisions are reviewable de novo by the
agency for which they adjudicate.325 To the extent that Seila Law and
the Appointments Clause cast doubt on good-cause removal protections for ALJs,326 it is all the more important to house ALJs in a central
panel rather than leave them in the agencies for which they conduct
adjudications. In the absence of good cause for removal, institutional
separation would be essential to prevent the conflict of interest that
would otherwise arise from an agency’s ability to remove ALJs that
conduct adjudications on its behalf.
If ALJs are to be protected by good-cause removal provisions,
however, it follows from Free Enterprise Fund that the dual goodcause removal problem must be avoided, which has implications for
both the central panel itself and the process for determining good
cause.327 With respect to the central panel itself, the most constitutionally prudent path would be to allow the panel’s head to be removable by the President at will.328 This approach would also avoid any
problems surrounding the removal of the panel’s head under Seila
Law.329 Dual good-cause removal provisions might be constitutionally

323. See Seila L., LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207 (2020)
(finding that even a broad construction of the good-cause removal provisions in question failed under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance).
324. See supra note 269 (promoting the strengthening of the statutory language of
good-cause removal protections).
325. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text (discussing factors lower
courts consider when deciding whether agency adjudicators are principal or inferior
officers, including being subject to de novo review).
326. See supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text (suggesting that Seila Law’s
holding questions the validity of good-cause removal provisions for ALJs); supra notes
176–83 and accompanying text (highlighting that good-cause removal provisions may
violate the Appointments Clause).
327. See 561 U.S. 477, 495 (2010) (holding unconstitutional dual good-cause removal provisions).
328. This would be a departure from the Revised Model Act, which provides for
the direction of the central panel by a Chief Administrative Law Judge removable only
for good cause. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 602 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
329. See supra notes 202–06 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of good-cause protections for principal officers at the head of agencies, as applied
to the SSA Commissioner in Seila Law).
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permissible,330 and Seila Law might not apply to officers whose sole
responsibility is to conduct adjudications,331 but it would be risky to
structure the central panel on those assumptions.
Addressing the dual good-cause removal problem within the central panel may not be enough, however. There is at least a plausible
argument that good-cause removal provisions for the MSPB or any
other agency Congress might make responsible for determining
whether good cause exists for the removal of ALJs would violate Free
Enterprise Fund.332 This problem is a difficult one to solve. Allowing
the head of the central panel to make the removal determination and
separating the central panel from the agency for which ALJs adjudicate would solve the problem and provide a modest degree of protection, but ALJs could still be exposed to politically driven removals from
office. This concern might be alleviated somewhat by creating a cause
of action in federal court by which ALJs could contest their removals.333 Alternatively, it might be possible to finesse the issue by drafting the statute so as to clarify that the decision to remove is made by
330. See supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text. It might be possible, however, to incorporate alternative removal provisions for the head of the central panel
constituting the agency housing ALJs as an independent agency but providing that the
good-cause removal provision for the agency head should be severed if the dual goodcause requirements are found to be unconstitutional.
331. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (arguing that if ALJs are inferior
officers lacking policymaking authority, they may fall under Seila Law exceptions).
332. See supra notes 170–75 and accompanying text (discussing proper remedy if
ALJ dual good-cause removal provisions violate Free Enterprise Fund’s holding that
such provisions are incompatible with Article II).
333. It may not be necessary to create an explicit cause of action for ALJs to contest
their removals. At least twice, the Supreme Court was willing to hear challenges to allegedly improper removals of executive officers filed in the Court of Claims even in the
absence of such a statutory cause of action. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 618–19 (1935) (involving representatives for a deceased, removed official
seeking to recover his salary from the date of his allegedly improper removal until his
death); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926) (involving a removed official
seeking his salary from the date of his removal to the end of his term). In neither case
did the Court question its jurisdiction or the basis for the plaintiffs’ cause of action. See
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 602–32; Myers, 272 U.S. at 106–08. The Court decided both
cases, however, before it essentially eliminated the implied private right of action. See,
e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–93 (2001) (holding there is no “freestanding private right of action” where Congress has not intended it). See generally
Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme
Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 387–89 (1989) (discussing
the Court’s disavowal of its prior “broad willingness to assist in statutory implementation through the implication of rights of action”). Creation of an explicit statutory cause
of action for ALJs to challenge their removal would eliminate any doubts about the existence of such an action and could also specify appropriate standards, procedures, and
remedies.
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the head of the central panel, and that the role of the independent reviewing body is to verify that good cause exists, while at the same time
limiting the deference that the reviewing body gives to the head of the
central panel.
3. Central Panel ALJs and the Agencies
The principal objections to a central panel relate to the loss of expertise from specialization and the need for agency control of policy.334 The weight of these concerns may be overstated insofar as ALJ
specialized expertise may be retained and agency policy control can
be abused, as discussed above.335 Thus, it would be important to structure the relationship between the central panel ALJs and the agencies
for which they adjudicate in a manner that insulates ALJs from improper agency influence, but nonetheless takes advantage of expertise
and allows the agency appropriate means of control over policy.
Specialized expertise can be retained if central panel ALJs specialize in adjudicating cases for a particular agency or agencies. This arrangement is feasible for agencies that employ a relatively large number of ALJs. Given the vast amount of disability adjudications,336 the
role of technical expertise, and the large number of ALJs involved,337
it would be easy enough for the central panel to use dedicated Social
Security ALJs. A similar arrangement would also be feasible for other
agencies that employ a relatively large number of ALJs, such as the
NLRB.338 For agencies that use ALJs only occasionally, however, a pool
of generalist ALJs would also be needed. Critically, however, the
agency should not be able to choose (or reject) the ALJ assigned to adjudicate a particular case.339
The agency’s legitimate need for control over policy could be addressed through several means. First and most directly, the agency (or
334. See supra notes 308–12 (identifying leading critics of the central panel
model).
335. See supra notes 233–42 (discussing agency policy abuse, particularly in the
SSA); infra text accompanying notes 336–43 (proposing methods to retain ALJ expertise).
336. See Disability Reviews, supra note 233, at 6 (opening statement of Senator
Levin) (indicating the growing number of cases reviewed each year by SSA ALJs).
337. See supra note 154 (identifying that as of March 2017, the SSA employed
1,655 of the 1,931 federal ALJs).
338. Id.
339. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 604(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010)
(providing that the chief judge of the central panel shall assign administrative law
judges to adjudicate cases); id. § 605(b) (specifying that, subject to limited exceptions,
“an agency may not reject a particular administrative law judge for a particular hearing”).
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an appellate body within the agency) should have the ability to decide
a case in the first instance if it presents essential policy questions that
the agency wishes to resolve, rather than automatically refer it to the
central panel.340 This option is currently available under the APA,341
and it is also preserved in the Revised Model Act.342 Similarly, the
agency could retain the power to review the decisions of an ALJ, just
as they do under current law.343 This arrangement would allow the
agency ample control over any policy matters embedded in adjudications, and it would also support the conclusion that ALJs are inferior
officers.344
Likewise, agencies could continue to bind ALJs to follow agency
policy through appropriate means. Most clearly, valid legislative rules
(promulgated using notice and comment procedures) would be binding on the public, ALJs, the agency, and the courts. Similarly, the
agency’s precedential adjudications could also bind ALJs. Legislative
rules and precedential adjudications can bind ALJs that are not part of
the agency itself because they involve the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority. Moreover, these policies are vetted through
340. If the agency chose not to resolve a case in the first instance, the central
panel’s jurisdiction would be mandatory. Likewise, if the agency did choose to resolve
the case, it should not be allowed to delegate decisional responsibility to other officials
within the agency.
341. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“When the agency did not preside at the reception of the
evidence, the presiding employee . . . shall initially decide the case . . . .”).
342. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 402(a) (“A presiding officer must
be an administrative law judge assigned in accordance with Section 604(2), the individual who is the agency head, a member of a multi-member body of individuals that
is the agency head, or, unless prohibited by law of this state other than this [act], an
individual designated by the agency head.”). The option of an agency head designating
a person other than an ALJ or the agency head should not be available in the federal
model.
343. See GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 36, at 221–27 (discussing judicial review
under the substantial evidence standard of review of agency decisions reversing ALJ
factual findings). Although this power of review is, in principle, de novo, in practice the
ALJ’s decision is part of the record and the agency must explain why it is rejecting the
ALJ’s conclusions. Id. Providing such an explanation is especially difficult for credibility
determinations. Id.
We do not think it should make a difference whether an ALJ’s decision becomes
the decision of the agency unless the agency reviews, or, as under NLRB regulations,
the ALJ’s decision is a recommended decision that automatically becomes the agency’s
decision if no one files any exceptions to it. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.11–101.12 (2019). In
either case, the agency retains the authority to determine policy matters and the combination of the ALJ’s limited authority and the agency’s supervisory authority are consistent with characterizing ALJs as inferior officers.
344. See supra notes 282–87 and accompanying text (discussing need to ensure
that central panel ALJs are inferior officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause).
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rulemaking or adjudicatory procedures and are transparent, in the
sense that they are formally adopted and published by the agency.
Because ALJs are not part of the agency itself, however, the
agency would not be able to use internal policies that are de facto
binding to control ALJ adjudication. This limitation would mean that
an agency could not bind central panel ALJs to nonlegislative rules
that are not vetted through notice and comment, although such policies might warrant some deference in ALJ adjudications, just as courts
afford them some deference. Critically, moreover, an agency would
not be able to issue other, less formal guidance or instruction and punish ALJs who do not follow it. In other words, although agencies could
control policy through legitimate means, the sort of improper influence that often plagues agency oversight of agency adjudicators would
be minimized.
CONCLUSION
Congress has repeatedly recognized the importance of independent administrative adjudication.345 In adopting statutes such as the
APA and the CSRA, Congress has created a carefully considered series
of safeguards to shield ALJs from improper influence while conducting
formal adjudications in which the government is a party.346 At the
same time, by allowing agencies to review the decisions of their ALJs,
Congress reserved to those agencies control over the exercise of discretionary authority delegated to them under their organic statutes.347 The resulting balance of ALJ independence and agency control
of policymaking has protected the integrity of administrative adjudication for more than seventy-five years.
Recent events have upset, if not eviscerated, that balance. A combination of Supreme Court decisions that allow the President to exercise greater control over the appointment and removal of ALJs and executive branch actions that exempt ALJ appointments from the civil
service hiring process and weaken good-cause removal requirements
for ALJs348 poses a serious threat to the independence of ALJs. The
safeguards that have long shielded ALJs from pressure to conform

345. See supra Part II.B (analyzing statutory protections for ALJ independence).
346. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (reviewing a brief legislative history
of the APA and CSRA).
347. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (providing for de novo review of an ALJ’s initial decision by
an agency).
348. See Exec. Order No. 13,843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the
Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018).
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their decisions to the political agenda of the agencies for which they
work (and to the larger presidential administration) are crumbling.
These developments suggest a pressing need for a legislative response that restores ALJ independence while conforming to the constitutional requirements for appointment and removal of ALJs that
have emerged from recent judicial decisions.349 There are various options to constitutionally reconstruct safeguards for ALJ independence.
One would be to restore competitive civil service appointments for
ALJs and strengthen good-cause removal requirements, but doing so
may improperly infringe on presidential discretion.350 Another possibility would be to vest authority to conduct administrative adjudication in either an Article III or an Article I administrative court, but, as
indicated above, that option would also be problematic, albeit for different reasons.351
A third option stands out to us as the most promising. We favor
the adoption of the central panel model that has been successfully
used in many states.352 ALJs would no longer work for the agencies
whose cases they adjudicate, but rather for a freestanding agency
headed by a chief ALJ. Appointments to the central panel would be
merit-based, and good-cause removal would be within the domain of
the chief ALJ, who would be removable by the President at will. To
protect agency policymaking discretion, agencies could adjudicate
cases themselves rather than refer them to the central panel, and they
could review ALJ decisions. Agencies, however, would not be able to
require ALJs to conform to policies that have not been adopted
through binding mechanisms such as notice and comment rulemaking
or precedential decisions.
The central panel model is an attractive way to restore the balance between ALJ independence and agency control of policymaking
discretion that has long been a critical feature of administrative adjudication by the federal government.353 Recent judicial decisions354 and
executive branch actions355 have disrupted that balance in ways that
call into question the integrity of administrative adjudication and its
insulation from undue political influence. Safeguarding the
349. See supra Part II.B.
350. See supra notes 267–72 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 279–99 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 20 (discussing the Revised Model Act).
353. See supra Part I.B.
354. See supra note 5 (discussing Lucia, Free Enterprise Fund, and Seila Law).
355. See Exec. Order No. 13,843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the
Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018).
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impartiality of ALJs should be a goal to which all corners of the political spectrum can subscribe. Adopting the central panel model can help
restore that important component of good governance.

